Writing Reasoned Decisions and Opinions: A Guide for Novice, Experienced, and Foreign Judges by Strong, S. I.
Journal of Dispute Resolution 
Volume 2015 Issue 1 Article 7 
2015 
Writing Reasoned Decisions and Opinions: A Guide for Novice, 
Experienced, and Foreign Judges 
S. I. Strong 
University of Missouri School of Law, strongsi@missouri.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr 
 Part of the Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons, and the Judges Commons 
Recommended Citation 
S. I. Strong, Writing Reasoned Decisions and Opinions: A Guide for Novice, Experienced, and Foreign 
Judges, 2015 J. Disp. Resol. (2015) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2015/iss1/7 
This Conference is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of 
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Dispute Resolution by an authorized 
editor of University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
bassettcw@missouri.edu. 
 Writing Reasoned Decisions and 
Opinions:  A Guide for Novice, 
Experienced, and Foreign Judges 
S.I. STRONG* 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
II. WHAT CONSTITUTES A REASONED DECISION OR OPINION 
III. WHY REASONED JUDGMENTS ARE NECESSARY OR USEFUL 
A. Structural Rationales for Reasoned Judgments 
B. Non-Structural Rationales for Reasoned Judgments 
IV. HOW TO WRITE REASONED JUDGMENTS 
A. Issues Relating to the Source of the Reasoned Judgment  
1. Trial court decisions  
2. Appellate court opinions 
B. Issues Relating to the Process of Writing a Reasoned Judgment 





ii. Summary of legal issues 
iii. Statement of facts 
iv. Analysis of the legal issues 
v. Disposition 
V. CONCLUSION 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Producing well-written reasoned judgments (a term that is used herein to de-
note both trial court decisions and appellate opinions) is the goal of all members 
of the bench.
1
  Badly written rulings can have significant legal consequences for 
                                                          
*   Ph.D. (law), University of Cambridge; D.Phil., University of Oxford; J.D., Duke University; 
Master in Professional Writing, University of Southern California; B.A., University of California, 
Davis.  The author, who is admitted to practice as an attorney in New York, Illinois and Missouri and 
as a solicitor in England and Wales, is the Manley O. Hudson Professor of Law at the University of 
Missouri and Senior Fellow at the Center for the Study of Dispute Resolution.  The author wrote much 
of this Article while serving as a U.S. Supreme Court Fellow and would like to thank Mira Gur-Arie, 
Director of the International Judicial Relations Office of the Federal Judicial Center, for helpful com-
ments on an earlier draft.  The opinions reflected herein are those of the author alone. 
 1. Technically, the term “judgment” refers to “the official pronouncement of the court” and “is 
distinguishable from a decision/opinion because it does not state the reasons for the decision.”  J.J. 
GEORGE, JUDICIAL OPINION WRITING HANDBOOK 40 (5th ed., 2007); see also id. at 69-71 (showing 
forms for judgments).  The term “decision” typically refers to a writing produced by a trial judge, 
whereas the term “opinion” is used to describe the writing produced by an appellate judge.  See id. at 
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both the parties, who may incur costs as a result of a need to appeal a poorly 
worded decision or opinion, and society as a whole, since a poorly drafted prece-
dent may drive the law in an unanticipated and unfortunate direction or lead to 
increased litigation as individuals attempt to define the parameters of an ambigu-
ous new ruling.  As a result, helping judges write decisions and opinions that are 




Good judicial writing is vital in common law countries like the United States, 
where the principle of stare decisis gives legal opinions the force of law.
3
  How-
ever, most common law countries, including the United States, do not have career 
judges who are given instruction in writing judicial rulings from the earliest days 
of their legal careers.
4
  Instead, most common law countries have inherited the 
English tradition of selecting judges from a pool of experienced lawyers who are 
considered competent to take up their judicial duties immediately upon ascending 
to the bench.
5
  However, the skills associated with judging are significantly differ-
ent from those associated with advocacy, and new judges face a very steep learn-
ing curve.
6
  Nowhere is this more true than with respect to the task of learning to 
write well-reasoned decisions and opinions.  As a result, many newly appointed 
judges find the “move from advocacy to decision, from marshalling and present-
                                                          
32, 37.  However, this Article will occasionally use the term “reasoned judgments” for convenience’s 
sake to refer to decisions and opinions that include both the reasoning and the final holding or disposi-
tion of the case.  See id. at 43.  This Article does not cover the form requirements for judgments, since 
those vary by jurisdiction.  See id. at 44-49. 
 2. See LIVINGSTON ARMYTAGE, EDUCATING JUDGES: TOWARDS A NEW MODEL OF CONTINUING 
JUDICIAL LEARNING 30 (1996).  This principle is true in a variety of jurisdictions.  See Mark A. Sum-
mers, The Surprising Acquittals in the Gotovina and Persĭć Cases: Is the ICTY Appeals Chamber a 
Trial Chamber in Sheep’s Clothing?, 13 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 377, 383-84 (2014) (discussing 
the need for a reasoned decision in international criminal trials).  But see Michael L. Wells, “Sociolog-
ical Legitimacy” in Supreme Court Opinion, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1011, 1029 (2007) (“French 
practice belies the notion that well-reasoned opinions are in some sense necessary.”).  Some authorities 
have suggested that judicial education should be considered part of a judge’s continuing ethical duty.  
See National Judicial Education Program, Testimony to the ABA Joint Commission to Evaluate the 
Model Code of Judicial Conduct 15 (Apr. 2004) (“Judicial education is essential to judges’ ability to 
meet the obligations of Canon 3: A Judge Shall Perform the Duties of Judicial Office Impartially and 
Diligently.”), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/judicialethics/ 
resources/Comm_Code_HechtSchafran_0504ddt.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 3. See Colin Starger, The Dialectic of the Stare Decisis Doctrine, 33 IUS GENTIUM 19 (2013) 
(discussing stare decisis and precedent in the context of the U.S. Supreme Court). 
 4. Judges in civil law countries are given this sort of early specialized training.  See Emily Kadens, 
The Puzzle of Judicial Education: The Case of Chief Justice William de Grey, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 143, 
143-45 (2009); Charles H. Koch, Jr., The Advantages of the Civil Law Judicial Design as the Model 
for Emerging Legal Systems, 11 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 139, 143 (2004).  Some proposals have 
been made in the United States regarding the development of a form of pre-appointment training, 
although that approach is also voluntary in nature.  See ABA, Standing Committee on Judicial Inde-
pendence, Report to the House of Delegates, Recommendation No. 113 (“[T]he American Bar Associ-
ation urges state, local, territorial bar associations, and the highest court of each state to establish, for 
those who have an interest in serving in the judiciary, a voluntary pre-selection/election program 
designed to provide individuals with a better appreciation of the role of the judiciary.”), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/leadership/2009/midyear/recommendations/11
3.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Aug 6, 2015). 
 5. See Kadens, supra note 4, at 143-45; Koch, supra note 4, at 143. 
 6. See Kadens, supra note 4, at 143. 
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ing evidence to fact-finding and synthesizing,” to be extremely challenging.7  
Indeed, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black, one of the most influential writ-
ers to ever grace the bench, once said that “the most difficult thing about coming 
on to the Court was learning to write.”8 
This is not to say that new judges are entirely without resources.  Judicial ed-









 with numerous providers offering instruction in judicial writing.  




First, it is not clear how many judges take up the opportunity to study judicial 
writing, since the decision of whether and to what extent to seek judicial education 
is entirely optional in many jurisdictions.
14
  Given the punishing caseloads that 
currently exist in both state and federal courts,
15
 as well as the often overwhelm-
ing number of new skills that new judges need to master immediately upon taking 
                                                          
 7. Jeffrey A. Van Detta, The Decline and Fall of the American Judicial Opinion, Part I: Back to 
the Future From the Roberts Court to Learned Hand – Context and Congruence, 12 BARRY L. REV. 
53, 55 (2009) [hereinafter Van Detta 1]. 
 8. WILLIAM DOMNARSKI, IN THE OPINION OF THE COURT 36 (1997) (citation omitted); see also 
Frank B. Cross, The Ideology of Supreme Court Opinions and Citations, 97 IOWA L. REV. 693, 742 
(2012).  Justice Black had not served as a judge prior to joining the Supreme Court bench. 
 9. For example, the Federal Judicial Center is the research and educational arm of the U.S. federal 
judiciary.  See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., fjc.gov (last visited June 1, 2015) [hereinafter FJC website]. 
 10. Private institutions include non-profit entities and academic institutions as well as for-profit 
centers.  For example, the National Judicial College is a Nevada-based non-profit originally created by 
the American Bar Association to educate judges nationwide and is now one of the leading sources of 
judicial education in the United States, particularly for U.S. state court judges.  See National Judicial 
College, http://www.judges.org (last visited June 1, 2015) [hereinafter NJC website].  Duke Law 
School offers a master’s degree program for federal, state and foreign judges.  See Duke Law Center 
for Judicial Studies, http://law.duke.edu/judicialstudies/degree/curriculum, (last visited June 1, 2015) 
[hereinafter Duke website].  Some questions have been raised about privately funded forms of judicial 
education.  See Center for Public Integrity, Corporations, Pro-Business Nonprofits Foot Bill for Judi-
cial Seminars (May 27, 2014) (“Conservative foundations, multinational oil companies and a prescrip-
tion drug makers were the most frequent sponsors of more than 100 expense-paid educational seminars 
attended by federal judges over a 4 ½ year period.”), http://www.publicintegrity.org/2013/03/28/ 
12368/corporations-pro-business-nonprofits-foot-bill-judicial-seminars (last visited June 1, 2015). 
 11. The FJC website includes a listing of other judicial education centers in the United States.  See 
FJC Website, supra note 9, at http://www.fjc.gov/ijr/home.nsf/page/jud_ed_us. 
 12. See id. at http://www.fjc.gov/ijr/home.nsf/page/jud_ed_intl (listing various foreign and interna-
tional judicial education institutes). 
 13. Formalized means of judicial education also face a number of philosophical challenges in com-
mon law countries.  See ARMYTAGE, supra note 2, at 29-40 (noting that common law countries only 
began to offer formalized means of judicial education in the mid-1960s and that the issue is still ex-
tremely polarized). 
 14. For example, there is no requirement that federal judges attend new judge orientations held by 
the FJC (although most do).  Furthermore, there is no continuing judicial education requirement for 
federal judges.  Some states have mandatory judicial education requirements, which may include 
mandatory classes in judicial writing, but those issues are addressed at the local level.  However, 
“[m]andatory judicial education is a vexed question. Many judges find it insulting and strenuously 
oppose it.”  National Judicial Education Program, supra note 2, at 15; see also ARMYTAGE, supra note 
2, at 29-40. 
 15. Many observers believe that the judicial branch is in crisis.  For example, filings in federal 
district court have risen 28 percent in the last 20 years, although the number of judges has grown by 
only 4 percent.  See Judge Information Center, As Workloads Rise in Federal Courts, Judge Counts 
Remain Flat (Oct. 14, 2014), available at http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/judge/364/. 
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the bench,
16
 it is perhaps understandable that writing is put on the back burner, 
particularly since many judges may feel that after decades of work as practicing 
attorneys, they are already competent writers.
17
  However, new judges may not 




Second, judicial education programs face several significant structural chal-
lenges, particularly when it comes to courses on judicial writing.  For example, 
most judicial education centers only ask judges to act as faculty, based on the fact 
that most judges prefer to be taught by other judges.
19
  This practice can result in a 
number of self-reinforcing behaviors as judges emphasize issues that they consid-
er to be important with little input from external or empirical sources.
20
  Addition-
al problems may arise because most judges are not especially qualified to teach 
writing, despite their experience on the bench.
21
  As a result, many judicial writing 
seminars end up focusing on personal anecdotes or basic writing techniques that 
do not address the deeper challenge of producing well-reasoned judgments.
22
 
These problems suggest that there is a critical need for further assistance re-
garding judicial writing techniques.
23
  Furthermore, it would appear that the judi-
                                                          
 16. For example, a new judge must learn how to control his or her courtroom and manage massive 
dockets while also staying on top of changes in the substantive law.  See FJC website, supra note 9 
(listing programs); NJC website, supra note 10 (listing programs); Duke website, supra note 10 (listing 
programs).  The FJC’s public website lists only a small number of programs.  Federal judges can 
access additional programming options through the federal judiciary’s intranet. 
 17. Of course, it is possible that new judges suffer from the Lake Woebegone Effect with respect to 
their writing skills.  See A Prairie Home Companion, The Lake Woebegone Effect (noting that all the 
children in Lake Woebegone are above average), http://prairiehome.org/2013/04/the_lake_wobegon 
_effect (last visited Aug. 3, 2015). 
 18. See Lawrence B. Solum, Communicative Content and Legal Content, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
479, 503-06 (2013). 
 19. Thus, the International Judicial Relations Committee of the U.S. Judicial Conference often sends 
federal judges abroad to participate in judicial education efforts.  See FJC, COMMITTEE ON 
INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL RELATIONS: A RESOURCE FOR THE JUDICIARIES OF OTHER NATIONS, avail-
able at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/IJR00012.pdf/$file/IJR00012.pdf.  Many of the 
delegations sent by U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) also include judges.  See 
Gary A. Hengstler, Training Court Personnel Overseas, COURTS TODAY MAG. (May/June 2006).  
Although staff members with expertise in a particular subject matter may provide outlines to judges 
serving as faculty, those materials are generally not considered mandatory, leaving the faculty free to 
structure their courses in any way they see fit. 
 20. See Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law; The Course and Pattern of Legal Change 
in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 628-29 (2001). 
 21. Many people cling to the belief that good writing cannot be taught, either because writing is an 
innate skill or because the range of opinions about what constitutes good writing is too diverse to 
support a single standardized treatment.  See S.I. STRONG, HOW TO WRITE LAW EXAMS AND ESSAYS 
1-2 (4th ed. 2014) [hereinafter STRONG, HOW TO WRITE].  While it is certainly true that good writing, 
including good judicial writing, can vary a great deal in terms of form, tone and style, that does not 
mean that it is impossible to identify certain common features that exist in all good legal decisions and 
opinions.  See LOUISE MAILHOT & JAMES D. CARNWATH, DECISIONS, DECISIONS . . . A HANDBOOK 
FOR JUDICIAL WRITING 100 (1998); see also DOMNARSKI, supra note 8, at 55-74, 90-115. 
 22. This type of approach is evident in various articles discussing judicial writing.  See Gerald 
Lebovits, A Pox on Vox Pop, N.Y. STATE B. J. 64 (July/Aug. 2004); Gerald Lebovits, Ethical Judicial 
Writing: Part II, N.Y. STATE B. J. 64 (Jan. 2007); Beverly B. Martin, Another Judge’s Views on Writ-
ing Judicial Opinions, 51 DUQUESNE L. REV. 41 (2013); Richard A. Posner, Legal Writing Today, 8 
SCRIBES J. LEGAL WRITING 35 (2001-2002); Douglas O. Tice, Jr., Reflections on Opinion Writing and 
Publishing: Part I, AM. BANKR. INST. J. 46 (Mar. 2007). 
 23. See ARMYTAGE, supra note 2, at 67 (“Once the need for judicial education is accepted, it is 
important to assess the nature of that need . . . .”). 
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cial community would derive a significant benefit from information provided in 
published form, since that avoids the cost and time associated with in-person sem-
inars.
24
  Written guides may be particularly appropriate, given that “[j]udges are 
generally autonomous [as learners], entirely self-directed, and exhibit an intensely 
short-term problem-orientation in their preferred learning practices.”25 
This Article attempts to fill that need by providing both experienced and nov-
ice judges with a structured and content-based method of writing fully reasoned 
decisions and opinions.  Although the current discussion is aimed primarily at 
judges sitting in U.S. state and federal courts, there are several other groups who 
can benefit from this analysis. 
The first such group involves judges and others who are participating in judi-
cial outreach efforts.  Over the last few years, an increasing number of public and 
private organizations such as the American Bar Association (ABA) and the U.S. 
Agency for International Development (USAID) have implemented programs that 
seek to bolster the international rule of law through education.
26
  These programs 
strive to provide judges in countries with struggling judicial systems with infor-
mation about alternative practices that could be suitable for adoption in those oth-
er nations.
27
  One popular area of discussion involves reasoned judgments.
28
  As a 
result, those who develop and serve as faculty on judicial outreach programs can 
                                                          
 24. See id. at 152. 
 25. Id. at 149. 
 26. See A.B.A., Rule of Law Initiative (ROLI), http://www.americanbar.org/advocacy/rule_of_ 
law.html (last visited Aug. 3, 2015) [hereinafter ABA ROLI]; USAID: Serbia, Judicial Reform, 
http://www.jrga.org/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&layout=item&id=65&Itemid=28&lang=e
n (last visited Aug. 3, 2015).  There can be some problems with transparency, since the USAID in 
particular tends to contract with for-profit, private organizations who conduct the educational pro-
grams.  See USAID: Kazakhstan, Judicial Education Project (KJEP), Year One Annual Report (Oct. 1, 
2009-Sept. 30, 2010) (noting the program was administered by a private contractor known as 
Chemonics), available at http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACU795.pdf; see also Chemonics Interna-
tional Inc., http://www.chemonics.com/Pages/Home.aspx (last visited Aug. 3, 2015). 
 27. See ABA ROLI, supra note 26. 
 28. Many of the countries that are involved in judicial outreach activities follow the civil law tradi-
tion, which does not rely on precedent in the same way that common law countries do.  See ABA 
ROLI, supra note 26 (noting jurisdictions where ROLI is active); USAID: Serbia, supra note 26; see 
also JANE S. GINSBURG, LEGAL METHODS 66, 69-70 (rev. 2d ed. 2004) (“The common law has its 
source in previous court decisions.  The main traditional source of the common law is therefore not 
legislation but cases . . . .  In civil law countries, cases are simply not a source of law – at least not in 
theory . . . .  Civil Law jurists tend to see the civil code as an all-encompassing document”).  Neverthe-
less, many of the foreign judges are interested in learning more about reasoned judgments, since many 
civil law countries have begun to rely more heavily on case law as a form of authority, thereby increas-
ing the need for well-reasoned judgments in those jurisdictions.  See David W. Louidsell, Procedure 
and Democracy, 35 TEX. L. REV. 892, 894 (1957) (book review) (discussing how judges in different 
countries, including the United States, Mexico and Italy, have presented judgments of the court); 
Mariana Pargendler, The Rise and Decline of Legal Families, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 1043, 1073 (2012); 
Allen Shoenberger, Change in the European Civil Law Systems: Infiltration of the Anglo-American 
Case Law System of Precedent Into the Civil Law System, 55 LOY. L. REV. 5, 5 (2009) (attributing this 
trend to the influence of the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights).  For 
an example of a contemporary civil law judgment that relies on judicial precedent, see Empresa 
Colombiana de Vías Férreas (Ferrovías) v. Drummond Ltd., 24 Oct. 2003—Consejo de Estado, Sala de 
lo Contencioso Administrativo, Seccion Tercera [Council of State, Administrative Chamber, Third 
Section], No. 25.25, ¶ 8, aff’d, 22 Apr. 2004, No. 24.261, ¶ 25, in XXIX Y.B. COMM. ARB. 643 (Albert 
Jan van den Berg ed., 2004). 
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The second group of persons who may appreciate information regarding rea-
soned judgments involves judicial law clerks who have been asked to write the 
first draft of a legal decision or opinion.
30
  Although the process of writing a rul-
ing under the direction of a judge is somewhat different than the process of writ-
ing a decision or opinion on one’s own behalf, there are nevertheless sufficient 
similarities to make this Article of interest to clerks.
31
 
The third group of persons who may benefit from this Article involves arbi-
trators who are asked to produce fully reasoned awards.  Fully reasoned awards 
are now standard in a number of types of arbitration
32
 and optional in several oth-
ers,
33
 which makes it necessary for arbitrators to understand how to draft such 
documents.  Although various arbitral institutions around the world offer pro-
grams on how to write reasoned awards, such training is largely optional, just as it 
is in the judicial context.
34
  Since a fully reasoned arbitral award is in many ways 
analogous to a fully reasoned judicial decision,
35
 arbitrators can benefit from the 
principles identified in the current discussion. 
The primary focus of this Article is on providing practical advice on how to 
write a reasoned decision or opinion (Section IV).  However, experts in education 
theory have found that adult learners do best when they understand why certain 
                                                          
 29. This Article occasionally refers to differences between common law and civil law systems so as 
to help participants in various judicial outreach initiatives (such as those organized by the ABA or 
USAID) understand the rationales underlying current U.S. practice and procedure.  However, these 
matters may be of interest to U.S. judges as well, since comparative analysis often provides a better 
understanding of one’s own legal system. 
 30. See infra notes 122-31 and accompanying text. 
 31. See LAW CLERK HANDBOOK: A HANDBOOK FOR LAW CLERKS TO FEDERAL JUDGES 10, 86, 94-
98 (2007), available at http://www.fjc.gov [hereinafter FJC Law Clerk Handbook]. 
 32. Reasoned awards are nearly universal in international commercial arbitration and investment 
arbitration.  See International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, Rules of Procedure for 
Arbitration Proceedings (Arbitration Rules), art. 47, available at https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/ 
StaticFiles/basicdoc/partF.htm; International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) Arbitration Rules, art. 31, 
available at http://www.iccwbo.org/Products-and-Services/Arbitration-and-ADR/Arbitration/Rules-of-
arbitration/ICC-Rules-of-Arbitration; S.I. STRONG, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: A 
GUIDE FOR U.S. JUDGES 22 (2012), available at http://www.fjc.gov [hereinafter STRONG, ICA]; Tai-
Heng Cheng & Robert Trisotto, Reasons and Reasoning in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 32 SUFFOLK 
TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 409, 409 (2009); W. Laurence Craig, The Arbitrator’s Mission and the Applica-
tion of Law in International Commercial Arbitration, 21 AM. REV. INT’L L. 243, 283 (2010). 
 33. Reasoned awards are often used in domestic forms of commercial arbitration on the request of 
the parties.  See American Arbitration Association (AAA), Commercial Arbitration Rules and Media-
tion Procedures, rule R-46(b), available at https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowProperty?nodeId=/UCM/ 
ADRSTG_004103. 
 34. See, e.g., Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, https://www.ciarb.org (last visited Aug. 6, 2015) 
(offering courses in award writing); American Arbitration Association, Course Calendar, https://www. 
aaau.org/courses (last visited Aug. 8, 2015) (offering courses in award writing); see also Thomas J. 
Brener et al., Awards and Substantive Interlocutory Arbitral Decisions, in COLLEGE OF COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATORS GUIDE TO BEST PRACTICES IN COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 225, 237-39 (James M. 
Gatis et al., eds., 2014); Daniel L. FitzMaurice & Maureen O’Connor, Preparing a Reasoned Award, 
14 ARIAS U.S. Q. (2007), available at http://www.daypitney.com/news/docs/dp_1987.pdf. 
 35. Although the definition of a fully reasoned arbitral award is evolving, some standards do exist.  
See Rain CII Carbon, LLC v. ConocoPhillips Co., 674 F.3d 469, 473-74 (5th Cir. 2012); Cat Charter, 
LLC v. Schurtenberger, 646 F.3d 836, 844-46 (11th Cir. 2011); see also S.I. Strong, Reasoned Awards 
in International Commercial Arbitration:  Embracing and Exceeding the Common Law-Civil Dichot-
omy, 37 MICH. J. INT’L L. __ (forthcoming 2016).  
6
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2015, Iss. 1 [2015], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2015/iss1/7
No. 1] Writing Reasoned Decisions and Opinions 99 
information is being presented,
36
 so the discussion of how to write reasoned judg-
ments will be preceded by a brief section on why such judgments are necessary or 
useful (Section III).  This Article also considers what a reasoned decision or opin-
ion actually is as a preliminary matter (Section II), since it is impossible to write 
such a document without a true appreciation for what is entailed in a well-
reasoned ruling. 
Before beginning, it is helpful to note a few basic points.  First, reasoned 
judgments can vary a great deal in terms of form, tone and style.
37
  As a result, 
this Article does not suggest a single, formulaic model of judicial writing that 
should be followed in all cases, since the best writing occurs when the author is 
true to his or her own voice.  However, those who seek to improve their writing 
often find it helpful to read a variety of types of good writing in order to develop a 
better appreciation of the effectiveness of certain writing techniques.  Although 
good judicial writing can be found in many places, those seeking a quick and easy 
compilation should consider reviewing the annual list of exemplary judicial writ-
ing compiled by the editors of The Green Bag Almanac & Reader.
38
  The deci-
sions and opinions contained on those lists are not only inspirational, they are also 
highly educational for anyone wishing to improve his or her own writing. 
                                                          
 36. According to Malcolm Knowles, one of the leading theorists of adult education, the strategies for 
teaching adult learners (described as andragogy as opposed to pedagogy, the teaching of children) 
should be based on six different principles. 
 Reason for Learning.  Adults need to know why they need to learn something prior to 
learning it. 
 Adult Self-Concept.  Children see themselves as dependent on the instructor’s will.  In 
contrast, adults have an independent self-concept that allows them to direct their own 
learning.  Instructors, therefore, have the responsibility to help adults move from de-
pendency on the instructor to increased self-directedness. 
 Experience.  Unlike children, adults have a vast reservoir of experience that can be 
used as a platform for experiential learning.  Effective learning can be accomplished 
through discussion or problem-solving exercises that allow adults to draw on their life 
experiences. 
 Readiness to Learn.  Adults more readily learn when they believe the information will 
assist them in dealing with real-life tasks or problems.  Thus, their education should be 
organized around life application categories. 
 Orientation to Learning.  Children perceive education as the learning of subjects (or 
subject-centered) with no immediate application.  Adults perceive education as a way 
of obtaining knowledge that can be used immediately to resolve problems (problem-
centered). 
 Motivation for Learning.  The most potent motivators for adult learning are internal. 
Joni Larson, The Intersection of Andragogy and Distance Education: Handing Over the Reins of 
Learning to Better Prepare Students for the Practice of Law, 9 T.M. COOLEY J. PRAC. & CLINICAL L. 
117, 123-24 (2007); see also MALCOLM S. KNOWLES, THE MODERN PRACTICE OF ADULT 
EDUCATION: FROM PEDAGOGY TO ANDRAGOGY 45-49 (1980).  These principles have been successful-
ly applied in the context of judicial education.  See ARMYTAGE, supra note 2, at 106-11, 127-30. 
 37. See MAILHOT & CARNWATH, supra note 21, at 100; see also DOMNARSKI, supra note 8, at 55-
74, 90-115.  A variety of judicial styles have been identified, including the imperial style, see Abrams 
v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting), the literary style, see Public Utils. 
Comm’n v. Pollack, 343 U.S. 451, 466-67 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.), the methodological style, see 
Bodum USA, Inc. v. La Cafatiere, Inc., 621 F.3d 624, 638-40 (7th Cir. 2010) (Wood, J., concurring), 
and the colloquial style, see Schatz v. RSLC, 669 F.3d 50, 52-55 (1st Cir. 2012) (Thompson, J.).  Other 
judges “defy classificiation.”  MAILHOT & CARNWATH, supra note 21, at 105 (discussing the Lord 
Denning); see also DOMNARSKI, supra note 8, at 116-55 (discussing Judge Richard Posner). 
 38. See The Green Bag Almanac & Reader, Exemplary Legal Writing, http://www.greenbag.org/ 
green_bag_press/almanacs/almanacs.html; see also DOMNARSKI, supra note 8, at 97-98; supra note 37 
(listing noteworthy legal opinions). 
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Second, in the interest of brevity, this Article does not address certain issues 
that are logically but tangentially related to reasoned judgments.  For example, 
this Article does not discuss whether a particular decision or opinion should be 
written or oral
39
 or whether a particular ruling should be published.
40
  Further-
more, this Article does not address basic rules of good writing or elements of 
style.  Although all of these matters are important, they are covered in detail else-
where and need not be discussed herein.
41
 
II.  WHAT CONSTITUTES A REASONED DECISION OR OPINION 
The first matter to consider involves the question of what constitutes a rea-
soned decision or opinion.
42
  Most lawyers can recite the standard definition of a 
reasoned ruling as one that includes “findings of fact and conclusions of law based 
upon the evidence as a whole . . . [and] clearly and concisely states and explains 
the rationale for the decisions so that all can determine why and how a particular 
result was reached.”43  However, this definition only goes so far, particularly for 
those seeking to write such a ruling, since finding “the appropriate methodology 
for distinguishing questions of fact from questions of law [is], to say the least, 
elusive.”44  Indeed, “the practical truth [is] that the decision to label an issue a 
‘question of law,’ a ‘question of fact,’ or a ‘mixed question of law and fact’ is 
sometimes as much a matter of allocation as it is of analysis.”45 
The difficulties associated with defining a reasoned judgment can lead some 
people to focus on various external attributes as a means of distinguishing a rea-
soned judgment from other types of written rulings.  However, that approach is 
problematic, since principles of judicial independence preclude the use of a single, 
standard format for reasoned judgments.  Furthermore, various differences arise 
                                                          
 39. This issue arises most frequently in courts of first instance.  See GEORGE, supra note 1, at 143-
45, 550. 
 40. See id. at 322-26, 364-66. 
 41. See id. at 553-70; Robert J. Martineau, Restrictions on Publication and Citation of Judicial 
Opinions: A Reassessment, 28 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 119 (1994).  Adherence to the rules of style is par-
ticularly important in the law, since legal decisions have been known to turn on the precise placement 
of a comma.  See Standard Bent Glass Corp. v. Glassrobots Oy, 333 F.3d 440, 449 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(construing an international convention).  Some good manuals concerning general principles of stand-
ard and legal writing include THE CHICAGO MANUAL OF STYLE (2010); ALASTAIR FOWLER, HOW TO 
WRITE (2007); BRYAN A. GARNER, THE ELEMENTS OF LEGAL STYLE (2002); BRYAN A. GARNER, 
LEGAL WRITING IN PLAIN ENGLISH: A TEXT WITH EXERCISES (2013); BRYAN A. GARNER, THE 
REDBOOK: A MANUAL ON LEGAL STYLE (2006); ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, MAKING 
YOUR CASE: THE ART OF PERSUADING JUDGES (2008); S.I. STRONG & BRAD DESNOYER, HOW TO 
WRITE BETTER LAW EXAMS: THE IRAC SYSTEM DEFINED AND EXPLAINED ch. 8 (2015); WILLIAM 
STRUNK JR. & E.B. WHITE, THE ELEMENTS OF STYLE (1999). 
 42. This is a difficult concept to describe in the abstract, and it may be easier to point to specific 
examples of good reasoned judgments.  For example, many people believe that Regents of the Univer-
sity of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), is an excellent example of a well-reasoned judgment.  
See Sumi Cho, From Massive Resistance, to Passive Resistance, to Righteous Resistance: Understand-
ing the Culture Wars From Brown to Grutter, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 809, 820 (2005); see also The 
Green Bag Almanac & Reader, supra note 38 (listing well-written judicial rulings on an annual basis). 
 43. 77 PA. STAT. ANN. § 834 (West 2013).  Although this definition arises in the context of the 
statutory duties of a workers’ compensation board, the principles appear to apply in other situations as 
well. 
 44. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 113-14 (1985) (citations omitted). 
 45. Id. (citation omitted). 
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according to whether the ruling was made by a trial court or an appellate court.
46
  
As a result, external criteria are largely useless as definitional tools. 
Instead, the best way to define a reasoned judgment is through a functional 
analysis that looks at how the opinion operates within the legal system.
47
  As it 
turns out, reasoned judgments arise in a limited category of cases that require a 
precedential ruling that is binding on more than the parties themselves, which 
suggests that the form and content of reasoned judgments are largely driven by the 
demands of the common law legal method.
48
  However, the common law has not 
always required written judgments,
49
 nor has the principle of precedent always 
been defined in the same way as it currently is.
50
  As a result, there appear to be 
other reasons why a reasoned judgment may be useful or necessary.  These issues 
are taken up in the following section. 
III.  WHY REASONED JUDGMENTS ARE NECESSARY OR USEFUL 
Judges trained in common law countries like the United States may think it 
unnecessary to consider why a judicial system should use reasoned judgments, 
since such rulings have long been considered structurally necessary as a result of 
the role that judicial pronouncements play in the common law legal tradition.  
However, close analysis of this issue provides a number of structural and non-
structural reasons why judges should write fully reasoned judgments.
51
  Interest-
ingly, a number of these rationales provide useful insights into how those rulings 
can and should be written. 
A.  Structural Rationales for Reasoned Judgments 
The best known rationale for reasoned judgments indicates that such rulings 
“serve as a statement of the necessary reasoning (the ‘ratio decidendi’) for courts 
bound to adhere to precedent under stare decisis.”52  The importance of stare 
decisis in the common law legal tradition means that courts must be clear when 
                                                          
 46. See GEORGE, supra note 1, at 32, 37. 
 47. Functionalism overcomes superficial differences, including those relating to the purported com-
mon law-civil law divide.  See Ralf Michaels, The Functional Method of Comparative Law, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 339, 342, 357 (Mathias Reiman & Reinhard Zimmerman 
eds., 2006). 
 48. See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 150-52, 164-65 (1949); 
GEORGE, supra note 1, at 32-34; Ruggero J. Aldisert et al., Opinion Writing and Opinion Readers, 31 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 8-9 (2009); see also infra notes 134-35 and accompanying text. 
 49. In the early days of the common law, judgments “were regularly preserved only in the memory 
of the suitors.”  Sir Frederick Pollock, English Law Before the Norman Conquest, 14 L. Q. REV. 291, 
292 (1898), as cited in READINGS ON THE HISTORY AND SYSTEM OF THE COMMON LAW 50 (Roscoe 
Pound & Theodore F.T. Plucknett eds., 1927). 
 50. Indeed, it was not until the late nineteenth century that courts began to impose upon themselves 
a strict duty to follow previous case law.  See KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, AN INTRODUCTION 
TO COMPARATIVE LAW 260 (Tony Weir trans., 3d ed. 1998). 
 51. This phenomenon suggests that reasoned judgments could be usefully adopted even in jurisdic-
tions that do not adhere to the common law legal tradition.  In fact, many commentators believe that 
many of the distinctions between the common law and civil law are eroding.  See supra note 28 and 
accompanying text. 
 52. FitzMaurice & O’Connor, supra note 34. 
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identifying the factual and legal basis of a particular decision.
53
  As a result, judg-
es in the United States and other common law countries are frequently required to 
write reasoned judgments. 
Although the principle of stare decisis is well-settled, opinions vary as to the 
particular matters that are to be considered precedential.  Indeed, “[w]hat facts or 
statements actually constitute precedent is the subject of much scholarly debate: at 
one extreme, some scholars only give precedential weight to the critical facts of 
the case; at another extreme, some scholars give precedential weight to any judi-
cial statement; other scholars provide for a mix of facts and statements.”54  Judges 
demonstrate a similar range of opinions regarding the precedential value of earlier 
rulings.  For example, when determining whether it is bound by an earlier deci-
sion, a court considers not merely the “reason and spirit of cases” but also “the 
letter of particular precedents.”  This includes not only the rule announced, but 
also the facts giving rise to the dispute, other rules considered and rejected and the 
views expressed in response to any dissent or concurrence.  Thus, when crafting 
binding authority, the precise language employed is often crucial to the contours 
and scope of the rule announced.
55
 
The individualized nature of the interpretative process suggests that judges 
must be extremely careful in how they write reasoned judgments.  Thus, Judge 
Alex Kozinski has stated: 
In writing an opinion, the court must be careful to recite all facts that are 
relevant to its ruling, while omitting facts that it considers irrelevant. 
Omitting relevant facts will make the ruling unintelligible to those not al-
ready familiar with the case; including inconsequential facts can provide 
a spurious basis for distinguishing the case in the future. The rule of deci-
sion cannot simply be announced, it must be selected after due considera-
tion of the relevant legal and policy considerations. Where more than one 
rule could be followed—which is often the case—the court must explain 
why it is selecting one and rejecting the others. Moreover, the rule must 
be phrased with precision and with due regard to how it will be applied in 
future cases. A judge drafting a precedential opinion must not only con-
sider the facts of the immediate case, but must also envision the countless 
permutations of facts that might arise in the universe of future cases. 
                                                          
 53. Stare decisis is the principle that subsequent courts must adhere to the legal conclusions estab-
lished in earlier judgments rendered by courts whose decisions are binding upon the ruling court.  
“Stare decisis reflects a policy judgment that in most matters it is more important that the applicable 
rule of law be settled than that it be settled right.”  National Aeronautics & Space Admin. v. Nelson, 
131 S. Ct. 746, 766 (2011) (citation omitted).  Normally, such an approach is preferable “because it 
promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles.”  Id.  However, 
stare decisis is not absolute.  Within the same level of courts, 
precedent is to be respected unless the most convincing of reasons demonstrates that adher-
ence to it puts us on a course that is sure error.  “Beyond workability, the relevant factors in 
deciding whether to adhere to the principle of stare decisis include the antiquity of the prec-
edent, the reliance interests at stake, and of course whether the decision was well reasoned.” 
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 362-63 (2010) (citations omitted); see also 
CARDOZO, supra note 48, 150-52, 158; GEORGE, supra note 1, at 305-11. 
 54. Kevin D. Klagge, Case Comment, Garcia v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 2866 (2011), 35 SUFFOLK 
TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 233, 236 n.16 (2012) (discussing sources). 
 55. See Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1170-71 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations and footnotes omitted). 
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Modern opinions generally call for the most precise drafting and re-
drafting to ensure that the rule announced sweeps neither too broadly nor 
too narrowly, and that it does not collide with other binding precedent 
that bears on the issue. Writing a precedential opinion, thus, involves 
much more than deciding who wins and who loses in a particular case. It 
is a solemn judicial act that sets the course of the law for hundreds or 
thousands of litigants and potential litigants. When properly done, it is an 
exacting and extremely time-consuming task.
56
 
As important as precedent is in the common law legal method, stare decisis is 
not the only structural reason for writing fully reasoned judgments.  A second 
structural rationale involves the role that reasoned judgments play in the appellate 
process.  Reasoned decisions provide critical information as to why the trial court 
decided as it did and therefore to help appellate courts determine whether a lower 
court decision should be upheld.
57
  While the need for the lower court’s rationale 
may not be necessary in situations when the appellate court considers issues de 
novo, judges in trial and intermediate appellate courts typically do not know 
whether and to what extent a particular matter will be appealed and what the rele-
vant standard of review may be.
58
  Therefore, it is best for lower courts to err on 
the side of caution and provide a fully reasoned analysis for higher courts to con-
sider. 
B.  Non-Structural Rationales for Reasoned Judgments 
The importance of the various structural rationales for reasoned judgments 
suggests that judges should always be aware of how a reasoned ruling may be 
interpreted and used by judges and lawyers in the future.  However, there are also 
a number of non-structural rationales supporting the use of reasoned decisions and 
opinions.  Not only do these rationales apply equally in both common law and 
civil law countries, they also provide useful information on how a judge can im-
prove his or her writing. 
                                                          
 56. Id. at 1176-77 (citation omitted). 
 57. See GEORGE, supra note 1, at 26.  Providing all of the relevant factual data and outlining each 
step of the legal analysis allows an appellate court to consider the propriety of the decision-making 
process below in a comprehensive and principled manner.  See id.  Traditionally, appellate judges in 
civil law countries have not had the same need as appellate judges in common law countries for a full 
factual analysis in the lower court because the civil law legal tradition is deductive rather than induc-
tive.  See S.I. STRONG ET AL., COMPARATIVE LAW FOR BILINGUAL LAWYERS: WORKING ACROSS THE 
ENGLISH-SPANISH DIVIDE ch. 3 (anticipated 2016) (noting that whereas “the civil law . . . uses deduc-
tive reasoning to move from general principles of law to particular outcomes in specific cases, the 
common law uses analogical or inductive reasoning to generate general principles of law as a result of 
legal conclusions generated in large numbers of individual disputes”); Julie Bédard, Transsystemic 
Teaching of Law at McGill: “Radical Changes, Old and New Hats,” 27 QUEEN’S L. J. 237, 269-70 
(2001).  However, the situation may be changing as some civil law jurisdictions begin to adopt a modi-
fied case law method.  See Shoenberger, supra note 28, at 5. 
 58. Although appellate courts in the United States have long considered a significant number of 
legal issues on a de novo basis, recent decisions from the U.S. Supreme Court have permitted, if not 
required, de novo analysis of certain mixed questions of law and fact.  See Russell M. Coombs, A Third 
Parallel Primrose Path: The Supreme Court’s Repeated, Unexplained, and Still Growing Regulation 
of State Courts’ Criminal Appeals, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 541, 547-48. 
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First and perhaps most importantly, use of reasoned judgments improves the 
decision-making process, thereby improving the quality of the decision itself.
59
  
As Judge Richard Posner has noted, “[r]easoning that seemed sound when ‘in the 
head’ may seem half-baked when written down, especially since the written form 
of an argument encourages some degree of critical detachment in the writer, who 
in reading what he [or she] has written will be wondering how an audience would 
react.”60  By encouraging judges to articulate their reasons for following a particu-
lar course of action, reasoned judgments help “rationalize the . . . process,” “safe-
guard against arbitrary decisions,” “prevent consideration of improper and irrele-
vant factors,” “minimize the risk of reliance upon inaccurate information,” and 
“attain[] . . . institutional objective[s] of dispensing equal and impartial justice” 
while simultaneously “demonstrat[ing] to society that these goals are being 
met.”61 
Second, reasoned judgments provide various benefits to society at large.  For 
example, “[r]equiring a trial court to provide a reasoned basis for the . . . [out-
come] imposed may enhance the court’s legitimacy as perceived by judges them-
selves and participants in the . . . justice system.”62  Although this rationale may 
initially seem to be most relevant to countries with weak or struggling judiciaries, 
respect for the U.S. judiciary appears to have decreased in recent years.  While 
most of the criticism has been aimed at the U.S. Supreme Court, which is increas-
ingly seen as operating in a highly politicized manner,
63
 concerns are now also 
being raised about state courts
64
 and lower federal courts.
65
  One of the ways to 
offset any negative perceptions that may currently exist about the judicial branch 
would be to increase the number of well-written and well-reasoned judgments that 
were produced in state and federal courts. 
Third, reasoned judgments may be easier to enforce internationally, since for-
eign courts can see that the judgment was reached in a logical and legally justifia-
ble manner.
66
  Globalization has resulted in an ever-increasing amount of litiga-
                                                          
 59. See GEORGE, supra note 1, at 27; Chad M. Oldfather, Writing, Cognition, and the Nature of the 
Judicial Function, 96 GEO. L.J. 1283, 1302 (2008). 
 60. Richard A. Posner, Judges’ Writing Styles (And Do They Matter?), 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1421, 
1447-48 (1995). 
 61. FitzMaurice & O’Connor, supra note 34, at n.19 (discussing Commonwealth v. Riggins, 474 Pa. 
115, 377 A.2d 140, 129-31 (1977)). 
 62. Id.; see also GEORGE, supra note 1, at 26. 
 63. See Barry Friedman, Why Are Americans Losing Trust in the Supreme Court?, THE NATION 
(June 18, 2012), http://www.thenation.com/article/168463/why-are-americans-losing-trust-supreme-
court#; David Paul Kuhn, The Incredible Polarization and Politicization of the Supreme Court, THE 
ATLANTIC (Nov. 6, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/06/the-incredible-polariza 
tion-and-politicization-of-the-supreme-court/259155/; Eric Segall, The Supreme Court Puts Its Legiti-
macy At Risk, CNN (May 12, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/05/12/opinion/segall-supreme-court-
political/. 
 64. Much of the concern at the state level focuses on the method by which judges are appointed or 
elected.  See David E. Pozen, The Irony of Judicial Elections, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 265, 266, 315 
(2008); Clifford W. Taylor, Merit Selection: Choosing Judges on Their Politics Under the Veil of a 
Disarming Name, 32 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 97, 101 (2009).  However, those concerns could be 
offset if those judges were seen as capable of producing well-reasoned judgments. 
 65. See Pema Levy, With Judicial Nominations Held Up, Justice Comes Slowly, NEWSWEEK (July 
21, 2014), http://www.newsweek.com/judicial-nominations-held-justice-comes-slowly-260029. 
 66. There is no widespread multilateral treaty on the recognition and enforcement of civil judgments 
outside the European Union, meaning many jurisdictions must rely on international comity when 
considering a foreign judgment.  See S.I. Strong, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments 
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tion involving foreign parties, which means that more judgments will be subject to 
international enforcement procedures in the coming years.
67
  As a result, judges 
around the world are perhaps under an increased duty to demonstrate the propriety 
of their rulings so as to promote international enforceability of judgments.
68
 
Fourth, reasoned judgments can act as persuasive authority in other courts, 
even if those rulings are not formally binding in those other jurisdictions.
69
  Judg-
es in the United States are well versed in this kind of comparative analysis, at least 
with respect to decisions and opinions rendered by sister courts in the United 
States.
70
  However, persuasive authority can also operate internationally.  Indeed, 
a number of courts, including those in England, Canada, Australia and New Zea-
land, routinely consider foreign legal sources, including those from the United 
States, when analyzing novel points of law.
71
  Although U.S. courts are often less 
inclined to look at foreign sources, some judges have been known to consult for-
eign or international law even in legal fields considered uniquely domestic, such 
as constitutional law.
72
  Some legal specialties, such as commercial law, derive 
particular benefits from international consistency.
73
 
                                                          
in U.S. Courts: Problems and Possibilities, 33 REV. LITIG. 45, 51-52 (2014) [hereinafter Strong, 
Recognition]. 
 67. See id. at 46-48. 
 68. Arbitrators are well-versed in this particular practice, since they are often taught to “protect the 
award” through judicious drafting.  See American Arbitration Association, Writing Arbitration 
Awards: A Guide for Arbitrators (April 23, 2014), https://www.aaau.org/media/20549/writing% 
20arbitration%20awards%20-%20materials.pdf; Edna Sussman, Arbitrator Decision-Making: Uncon-
scious Psychological Influences and What You Can Do About Them, XI REVISTA BRASILEIRA DE 
ARBITRAGEM 76, 83 (2014); see also Jose Maria Alonso Puig, Deliberation and Drafting Awards in 
International Arbitration, in LIBER AMICORUM BERNARDO CREMADES 131, 144-58 (Miguel Ángel 
Fernández-Ballesteros & David Arias eds. 2010); Marcel Fontaine, The ICC Arbitral Process – Part 
IV: The Award – Drafting the Award – A Perspective from a Civil Law Jurist, 5 ICC BULL. 30 (1994); 
Humphrey Lloyd, Writing Awards – A Common Lawyer’s Perspective, 5 ICC BULL. 38 (1994).  Alt-
hough some countries look at to the procedural fairness associated with an individual judgment, other 
countries consider the fairness of a country’s judicial system on a systemic level.  See RONALD A. 
BRAND, RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS 13, 21-20 (2012), available at 
http://www.fjc.gov; Samuel P. Baumgartner, How Well Do U.S. Judgments Fare in Europe, 40 GEO. 
WASH. INT’L L. REV. 173, 227-30 (2008); Strong, Recognition, supra note 66, at 70-76 (discussing 
U.S. system).  Routine use of reasoned judgments may also alleviate fears about systemic ills that 
extend beyond the dispute in question. 
 69. See STRONG, HOW TO WRITE, supra note 21, at 63. 
 70. See Mary Garvey Allegro, A Step in the Right Direction: Reducing Intercircuit Conflicts by 
Strengthening the Value of Federal Appellate Court Decisions, 70 TENN. L. REV. 605, 610 (2003) 
(“[F]ederal courts routinely consider and review the decisions of their sister courts when faced with 
federal law issues of first impression in their jurisdiction.”); Chad Flanders, Toward a Theory of Per-
suasive Authority, 62 OKLA. L. REV. 55, 75-76 (2009). 
 71. See STRONG ET AL., supra note 57, ch. 5. 
 72. See Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1170-71 (9th Cir. 2001); Rex D. Glensy, Which Countries 
Count?  Lawrence v. Texas and the Selection of Foreign Persuasive Authority, 45 VA. J. INT’L L. 357, 
358-60 (2005); S.I. Strong, Religious Rights in Historical, Theoretical and International Context: 
Hobby Lobby as a Jurisprudential Anomaly? 48 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 813, 817 (2015) (noting the 
usefulness of comparative analysis in the area of constitutional law). 
 73. See STRONG, ICA, supra note 32, at 16, 21, 23, 93.  Thus, the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) has put together a publicly accessible electronic database 
including case law on UNCITRAL texts (CLOUT).  See UNCITRAL, CLOUT, http://www.uncitral. 
org/uncitral/en/case_law.html.  Although “[t]he purpose of the system is to promote international 
awareness of the legal texts formulated by the Commission and to facilitate uniform interpretation and 
application of those texts,” the database also provides very useful comparative data regarding the 
various styles of judicial writing.  Id. 
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Not every judge will find each of the preceding rationales equally persuasive.  
However, this brief analysis provides a strong foundation for the use of reasoned 
judgments, even in cases where stare decisis may not apply.  Agreeing that rea-
soned judgments are beneficial is only the first step; the more important issue is 
how to write such documents. 
IV.  HOW TO WRITE REASONED JUDGMENTS 
Writing a reasoned judgment is a difficult and time-consuming task.
74
  How-
ever, both the process and the quality of writing can be greatly assisted by a deep-
er understanding of certain structural issues affecting both the shape and the con-
tent of the ruling.  Therefore, this section considers issues relevant to the source of 
the judgment (i.e., whether the judgment comes from a trial court or an appellate 
court) and the method of writing the judgment (i.e., whether the judgment is writ-
ten by a single person or a panel) before discussing a framework for drafting a 
reasoned judgment. 
A.  Issues Relating to the Source of the Reasoned Judgment 
Although decisions produced by trial courts are in many ways analogous to 
opinions produced by appellate courts, some differences nevertheless exist, pri-
marily as a result of the different functions of the two types of rulings.
75
  These 
distinctions are outlined below. 
1.  Trial court decisions 
“[M]ost judicial writing seminars hold up appellate opinions as the exemplars 
of ‘good judicial writing,’” thereby leaving many “[i]mportant questions about the 
role of trial court judges as opinion writers” unexplored.76  As it turns out, trial 
court judges face a number of challenges not visited upon appellate court judges.  
For example, the trial court judge does not find the facts and evidence readily 
organized and the evidence logically sifted.  The trial court opinion must create a 
coherent narrative from the raw source material—the evidence (witness testimo-
ny, depositions, exhibits, reports, demonstrative evidence) introduced at trial.  The 
trial court is thus able to indulge less artistry (and sometimes license approaching 




When drafting a reasoned decision, a trial court judge should aim to include a 
full discussion of “the nature of the case, the issues, the facts, the law applicable to 
the facts, and the legal reasoning applied to resolve the controversy.”78  This type 
of content is necessary because the trial court decision “is the authoritative answer 
                                                          
 74. See Hart, 266 F.3d  at 1176-77. 
 75. See GEORGE, supra note 1, at 25. 
 76. Van Detta 1, supra note 7, at 54-55. 
 77. Id. at 56. 
 78. GEORGE, supra note 1, at 32-33. 
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to the questions raised by the litigation . . . [and] should explain the reasons upon 
which the judgment is to rest.”79 
Trial courts have a unique perspective on the factual record in a particular 
case and therefore have a duty to report findings of fact accurately and complete-
ly,
80
 particularly with respect to witness credibility.
81
  Trial courts also have a 
responsibility to organize the factual record in such a way as to facilitate subse-
quent review by higher courts, even if most or all of the key documents will sub-
sequently be made available to the appellate court.
82
 
When writing a reasoned decision, a trial judge must adopt an approach that 
minimizes the possibility of appeal.
83
  Badly written opinions (whether they are 
confusing, illogical or simply unsupported by legal or factual authority) may not 
only increase the possibility the decision will be overturned, they may make the 
parties more inclined to appeal a decision.
84
  Even if the litigation involves an 
issue on which an appeal is likely (due to its novel nature, for example), a well-
written trial court decision can facilitate the appeals process by limiting the range 
of disputable issues.  Since an appellate court can dispose of a narrowly tailored 
appeal more easily than one that is broadly framed, the trial court might well be 




Some questions can arise as to whether a trial judge should rule in the alterna-
tive.
86
  On the one hand, providing an alternative decision can be confusing and 
hence inefficient to the extent that parties and judges who read the decision are not 
able to discern the precise basis on which the holding is founded.
87
  On the other 
hand, reasoning in the alternative can also be said to increase efficiency, since an 
                                                          
 79. Id. 
 80. Some countries allow facts to be introduced at the appellate level.  See Keith A. Findley, Inno-
cence Protection in the Appellate Process, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 591, 609 (2009).  Although that practice 
is not currently followed in the United States as part of the standard appeals process, some commenta-
tors support a change in the current system.  See id. at 609-11. 
 81. Notably, not every jurisdiction values oral testimony as much as the United States does.  For 
example, civil law legal systems consider documentary evidence to be more reliable than oral testimo-
ny and therefore more important to the determination of a dispute.  See Yves-Marie Morissette, Evi-
dence and the Civil Law Tradition in Thirty Minutes Flat, 18 CAN. CRIM. L. REV. 309, 317 (2014). 
 82. See Van Detta 1, supra note 7, at 76. 
 83. Arbitrators are also taught to adopt this type of defensive writing.  See supra note 68 (noting that 
arbitrators are taught to protect the award from subsequent review). 
 84. For example, a plaintiff who believes that he or she has not been fully “heard” at trial (a phe-
nomenon that could be directly affected by the quality or content of the written decision) might appeal, 
even if the chance of prevailing on appeal seems relatively low.  See Theodore Eisenberg & Michael 
Heise, Plaintiphobia in State Courts?  An Empirical Study of State Court Trials on Appeal, 38 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 121, 126 (2009). 
 85. Judicial efficiency is a core concern in a number of jurisdictions.  See Council of Europe, Euro-
pean Commission for the Efficiency of Justice, http://www.coe.int/T/dghl/cooperation/cepej/default 
_en.asp (last visited Jan. 17, 2015); North Carolina General Assembly, Legislative Research Commis-
sion, Committee on Judicial Efficiency and Effective Administration of Justice, Report to the 2014 
Session of the 2013 General Assembly of North Carolina (Apr. 2014), available at http://ncleg.net/ 
Library/studies/2014/lrc2014juidicial.pdf. 
 86. “An alternative ground used to support a decision is not dictum.”  GEORGE, supra note 1, at 331. 
 87. Avoidance of confusion is another reason why judges do not always outline the entire basis for 
their decision.  See Konrad Schiermann, A Response to the Judge As Comparativist, 80 TULANE L. 
REV. 281, 287-90 (2005). 
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appellate court may uphold the decision on the alternative rationale, thereby 
avoiding the need to remand the case for rehearing.
88
 
2.  Appellate court opinions 
Appellate courts (a term that encompasses both intermediate courts and courts 
of final resort) fulfill a different function than trial courts and therefore require a 
different type of written ruling.
89
  Generally, an appellate “opinion provides a 
succinct statement of the facts with the major emphasis placed upon the law.  The 
reasons should be set forth clearly so that the disposition is easily understanda-
ble.”90 
When drafting reasoned opinions, appellate judges must keep several goals in 
minds.  The first, of course, is the need to act justly, not only an individual level 
but also on a societal level.
91
  Appellate courts—particularly those of final re-
course—have an obligation to achieve an outcome that is not only appropriate in 
the dispute at bar (justice in personam) but also in any similar cases that may arise 
in the future (justice in rem).
92
  Although this duty may be most apparent in com-
mon law jurisdictions as a result of the common law’s ability to develop legal 
principles through judicial precedent,
93
 courts in civil law systems also strive to-
wards consistency in their jurisprudence, particularly with respect to judgments 
from higher courts, and therefore must keep both individual and societal needs in 
mind when writing appellate opinions.
94
 
Appellate courts in the United States review lower court decisions for three 
reasons:  (1) to correct the lower court; (2) to allow for the progressive develop-
ment of the law; and (3) to ensure the uniformity of the law.
95
  While the question 
of whether to render a fully reasoned opinion in any particular case is a matter of 
judicial discretion,
96
 some commentators have suggested that reasoned opinions 
are most needed in cases involving the progressive development of the law.
97
 
                                                          
 88. The term “holding” is used to describe the outcome of a trial court decision, whereas the term 
“disposition” is used to describe the outcome of an appellate court proceeding.  See GEORGE, supra 
note 1, at 37. 
 89. See id. at 257. 
 90. Id. at 33. 
 91. See Aldisert et al., supra note 48, at 36 (noting judges need to focus on “more than justice in 
personam, a consideration for the peculiar rights of the parties before their court; there must also be 
justice in rem, fidelity to what has been decided in the past as a guide to setting the course for the 
future”). 
 92. See GEORGE, supra note 1, at 275; Aldisert et al., supra note 48, at 14. 
 93. Appellate courts in the United States review lower court decisions for three reasons: (1) to cor-
rect the lower court; (2) to allow for the progressive development of the law; and (3) to ensure the 
uniformity of the law.  See Aldisert et al., supra note 48, at 12.  Some people believe that the role of 
the common law is diminishing in the United States, particularly in U.S. federal courts, where courts 
are primarily bound by statutory or constitutional law.  See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR 
THE AGE OF STATUTES 5-7 (1982); Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The 
Role of the United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 16-17 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997). 
 94. See PETER DE CRUZ, COMPARATIVE LAW IN A CHANGING WORLD 70 (3d edn. 2007). 
 95. See Aldisert et al., supra note 48, at 12. 
 96. See GEORGE, supra note 1, at 143-45, 550. 
 97. See id. at 276; Aldisert et al., supra note 48, at 12. 
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Fully reasoned appellate opinions contain a number of features that are also 
seen in trial court decisions, as discussed further below.
98
  However, appellate 
court judges have a heightened duty to include a detailed description of the proce-




Like trial courts, intermediate appellate courts need to consider whether to 
rule in the alternative.
100
  The issues at the appellate level are the same as at first 
instance, with judges needing to balance questions of efficiency against the possi-
bility of confusion.
101
  Courts of last resort should avoid alternate holdings, since 




Appellate courts also need to consider whether and to what extent to allow 
dissenting and concurring judgments.  Some jurisdictions prohibit the use of indi-
vidual opinions on the grounds the court should speak with one voice, while other 
jurisdictions allow judges to write individual opinions without even trying to ob-
tain a single majority opinion.
103
  The preference in most U.S. jurisdictions is for a 
single majority opinion, although individual opinions are allowed if consensus 
cannot be reached.
104
  Thus, a judge may write a dissenting opinion if he or she 
cannot join the majority opinion as a matter of judicial integrity.
105
  A concurring 
opinion may be appropriate if a judge agrees with the outcome reached by the 
majority but arrives at that result through different analytical means.
106
 
Some people oppose the use of individual opinions because such opinions are 
said to threaten the legitimacy of both the court and the law by demonstrating a 
                                                          
 98. See infra notes 132-270 and accompanying text. 
 99. This duty to include the procedural history extends to trial judges who are temporarily acting in 
an appellate capacity.  See W. Cory Haller & Karen E. Robertson, Untangling Federal Administrative 
Appeals Practice in the District of Colorado, 42 COLO. LAW. 31 (March 2013) (noting that U.S. dis-
trict courts take on quasi-appellate jurisdiction when reviewing decisions of a federal administrative 
agency), available at http://www.cod.uscourts.gov/Portals/0/Documents/Judges/JLK/jlk_CH-KR-AP-
docket-article-03-2013-Colo-Lawyer.pdf; see also United States Courts, The Appeals Process, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/UnderstandingtheFederalCourts/HowCourtsWork/TheAppeals
Process.aspx.  District courts also act in a quasi-appellate manner when reviewing decisions by a 
magistrate judge, although the standard of review differs depending on the manner in which the matter 
was referred to the magistrate.  See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) (2014); Sunil R. Harjani, Dispositive or 
Non-Dispositive?  The Applicable Standard of Review of a Magistrate Judge’s Decision, 17 CBA REC. 
40, 40-41 (Sept. 2003). 
 100. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text. 
 101. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text. 
 102. GEORGE, supra note 1, at 37, 331. 
 103. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185, 1189 (1992) 
(discussing the use of individual opinions in English courts); Vlad Perju, Reason and Authority in the 
European Court of Justice, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 307, 309 (2009) (discussing the need for a single opinion 
in the European Court of Justice). 
 104. See GEORGE, supra note 1, at 281.  Of course, judicial practices can change over time.  Thus, the 
United States Supreme Court at one time strongly disfavored the use of dissenting and concurring 
opinions, although such opinions are now a common occurrence.  See DOMNARSKI, supra note 8, at 
32, 59, 71-74; WILLIAM D. POPKIN, EVOLUTION OF THE JUDICIAL OPINION: INSTITUTIONAL AND 
INDIVIDUAL STYLES (2007).  Chief Justice John Marshall began the tradition of offering a single ma-
jority opinion in most U.S. Supreme Court cases.  See DOMNARSKI, supra note 8, at 32. 
 105. See GEORGE, supra note 1, at 282, 326-30. 
 106. See id.; see also SUPREME COURT OF OHIO, WRITING MANUAL: A GUIDE TO CITATIONS, STYLE 
AND JUDICIAL OPINION WRITING 153-54 (2012) (noting various types of concurrences), available at 
http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/manual.pdf. 
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lack of unanimity among the members of the court.
107
  However, others believe 
that a well-written dissent or concurrence can increase the legitimacy of the law, 
particularly in cases where the majority decision is later overruled or abrogated, 
since the dissent or concurrence demonstrates longstanding judicial support for the 
“new” interpretation of the relevant principle.108 
Appellate judges also need to be aware of the possibility of “strategic” dis-
sents in jurisdictions where a dissent at the intermediate appellate level automati-
cally triggers review of the case by the highest court in that jurisdiction.
109
  In 
those cases, it is particularly important that both the majority and the dissenting 
opinions be well-written, since the scope for appeal to the high court may be set 
by the parameters of the dissenting opinion rather than by the parties, as would be 




Some courts view dissents as problematic because they diminish collegiality 
among members of the court.
111
  However, other courts consider a well-written 
dissent as advancing the legal debate, so long as the dissent is written in a respect-
ful manner.
112




B.  Issues Relating to the Process of Writing A Reasoned Judgment 
How a reasoned judgment is written can have a significant effect on its con-
tent and style.  As a rule, trial judges have more flexibility than appellate judges in 
this regard, since trial judges work alone and have only their own consciences to 
consider.  Because appellate courts involve multiple judges or justices, the draft-
ing process often includes a certain amount of compromise and negotiation.
114
 
Every appellate court approaches the process of writing judgments different-
ly.
115
  Sometimes, writing assignments are known from the very beginning, while 
                                                          
 107. See GEORGE, supra note 1, at 329. 
 108. See id.; compare Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, Shawnee County, Kan., 347 U.S. 686 
(1954), with Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); see also Linda Przybyszewski, Book Review, 
The Dilemma of Judicial Biography or Who Cares Who is the Great Appellate Judge? Gerald Gunther 
on Learned Hand, 21 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 135, 153, 156 (1996). 
 109. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-30 (2014); Justice Robert Orr, What Exactly is a “Substantial 
Constitutional Question” for Purposes of Appeal to the North Carolina Supreme Court? 33 CAMPBELL 
L. REV. 211, 211 (2011) (noting that in North Carolina appeal to the state supreme court exists as of 
right if the intermediate appellate court is not unanimous and on a discretionary basis if the intermedi-
ate appellate court is unanimous). 
 110. See Orr, supra note 109, at 211. 
 111. See GEORGE, supra note 1, at 329. 
 112. See id. at 281. 
 113. See id.  Empirical studies have suggested that the most sarcastic member of the U.S. federal 
bench is Justice Antonin Scalia.  See Debra Cassens Weiss, Scalia Tops Law Prof’s Sarcasm Index, 
ABA L.J. (Jan. 20, 2015), available at http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/scalia_tops_law_profs 
_sarcasm_index.  Observers have suggested that “such heavy use of sarcasm can demean the court, and 
. . . arguably demonstrates Justice Scalia’s lack of respect for the legal opinions of his colleagues.”  Id. 
(quoting Professor Richard Hansen, the author of the study). 
 114. See Aldisert et al., supra note 48, at 12-14 (discussing how the deliberations process affects how 
an opinion is written); Tom Cobb & Sarah Kaltsounis, Real Collaborative Context: Opinion Writing 
and the Appellate Process, 5 J. ASS’N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 156, 158-63 (2008). 
 115. See DOMNARSKI, supra note 8, at 32-34 (discussing the process at the U.S. Supreme Court); 
Daniel J. Bussell, Opinions First - Argument Afterward, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1194, 1196-97 (2014) 
(discussing the California Supreme Court’s unusual approach of writing opinions before hearing oral 
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at other times the primary author is not identified until after the hearing.
116
  In 
either case, 
[t]he writing judge has the responsibility of drafting the proposed opinion, 
which may be adopted by the other members of the panel and which ulti-
mately speaks for the court.  The writing judge . . . does not have the lux-
ury of writing independently, but should approach the opinion-writing 
task so that it will reflect the collective mind of the collegial body that 
makes up the panel.
117
 
After the first draft is circulated, members of the court continue their delibera-
tions by parsing through the language of the draft.
118
  Ideally, judges who disagree 
with portions of the draft opinion should not only identify the grounds for disa-
greement but should also “[o]ffer alternative solutions for the writing judge to 
consider.”119  This process is critically important, since the opinion must reflect 
the views of a majority of the court.
120
  If the judges can reach only a narrow con-
sensus, then the resulting opinion will have to be equally narrow.
121
 
One issue that is becoming increasingly important in both trial and appellate 
courts involves the role of law clerks in writing reasoned judgments.
122
  Judges in 
the United States have long used law clerks to help draft opinions, and the practice 
appears to be spreading to other jurisdictions.
123
  Commentators have expressed a 
variety of concerns about the extensive use of law clerks in U.S. courts, noting 
(among other things) the way in which the use of law clerks has affected the style 
of written decisions and opinions.
124
  The first change involved the number and 
                                                          
argument); Goodwin Liu, How the California Supreme Court Really Works: A Reply to Professor 
Bussell, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1246, 1250-58 (2014) (rebutting allegations about the California Supreme 
Court). 
 116. See DOMNARSKI, supra note 8, at 122-23. 
 117. GEORGE, supra note 1, at 279. 
 118. See Aldisert et al., supra note 48, at 12-14. 
 119. GEORGE, supra note 1, at 281.  Criticism should also be limited to matters of substance rather 
than style.  See id. at 282. 
 120. See Aldisert et al., supra note 48, at 14. 
 121. See id.  Authorship of the final opinion can be attributed to one individual or to the court (or a 
majority of the court) as a whole.  Per curiam opinions fall into the latter category.  See GEORGE, supra 
note 1, at 323.  However, per curiam opinions of the U.S. Supreme Court are often accompanied by 
individual opinions.  See id. 
 122. The concept of a judicial law clerk varies by jurisdiction.  In the United States, a law clerk is a 
very recent law school graduate, perhaps with no professional experience.  In other jurisdictions, a law 
clerk is much more senior attorney or a trainee judge.  See David S. Law, The Anatomy of a Conserva-
tive Court: Judicial Review in Japan, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1545, 1546 (2009) (discussing law clerks in 
Japan); Franziska Weber, ‘Hanse Law School’ – A Promising Example of Transnational Legal Educa-
tion?  An Alumna’s Perspective, 10 GERMAN L.J. 969, 971 (2009) (discussing German Rechtsref-
erendar). 
 123. See Mathilde Cohen, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Deliberations: Two Models of Judicial Delibera-
tions in Courts of Last Resort, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. 951, 972 (2014) (discussing use of law clerks in the 
European Court of Justice); Gerald Lebovits et al., Ethical Judicial Opinion Writing, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 237, part VIII (2008); see also William J. Knudsen, Jr., Soundoff, ARIZ. ATT’Y 6 (July/Aug. 
2006) (noting the practice of law clerks writing first drafts for U.S. judges occurred as early as 1956).  
For more on the history of law clerks in the United States, particularly at the U.S. Supreme Court, see 
Paul R. Baier, The Law Clerks: Profile of an Institution, 26 VAND. L. REV. 1125, 1129-32 (1973). 
 124. See DOMNARSKI, supra note 8, at 66.  For more on the propriety of using law clerks as primary 
authors, see id. at 42-45; RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 139-
59 (1996); Stephen J. Choi & G. Mita Gulati, Which Judges Write Their Opinions (And Should We 
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style of footnotes, which were initially all that law clerks were asked to draft.
125
  
However, as clerks became more extensively involved in the writing process, 
observers began to notice that an increasing number of reasoned decisions and 
opinions were taking on the characteristics of a law review article, which is the 
type of writing with which U.S. law clerks are most familiar.
126
 
The current practice in the United States is for clerks to write the first draft of 
a reasoned decision or opinion, although some judges have refused to relinquish 
that task.
127
  Editing someone else’s work is obviously a very different task than 
writing the first draft oneself and one that judges should take seriously.
128
 
This Article does not discuss how best to instruct a clerk in the process of 
drafting an opinion,
129
 nor does this discussion consider the intricacies of editing 
one’s own or others’ work,130 although both issues are of great importance to the 
production of well-reasoned judgments.  Fortunately, there are numerous re-




While it is important to recognize issues relating to authorship, such matters 
ultimately do not affect the core characteristics of a well-reasoned judgment.  
                                                          
Care)? 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1077, 1078 (2005); David Crump, Law Clerks: Their Roles and Rela-
tionships with Their Judges, 69 JUDICATURE 236, 238 (1986); Sally J. Kenney, Puppeteers or Agents? 
What Lazarus’s Closed Chambers Adds to Our Understanding of Law Clerks at the U.S. Supreme 
Court, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 185, 200-06 (2000); J. Daniel Mahoney, Law Clerks: For Better or for 
Worse?, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 321, 332-34, 338-44 (1988); David McGowan, Judicial Writing and the 
Ethics of the Judicial Office, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 509, 555-67 (2001); Mark C. Miller, Law 
Clerks and Their Influence at the Supreme Court: Comments on Recent Works by Peppers and Ward, 
39 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 741, 741-55 (2014). 
 125. See DOMNARSKI, supra note 8, at 66. 
 126. See id. at 66, 94. 
 127. For example, Judge Richard Posner is said to write his opinions singlehandedly.  See id. at 122. 
 128. For more on editing judicial writing, see FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, JUDICIAL WRITING 
MANUAL: A POCKET GUIDE FOR JUDGES 25-26 (2013) [hereinafter FJC MANUAL], available at 
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/judicial-writing-manual-2d-fjc-2013.pdf/$file/judicial-
writing-manual-2d-fjc-2013.pdf; MAILHOT & CARNWATH, supra note 21, at 84. 
 129. There are a variety of resources available to discuss best practices on internal operating proce-
dures.  See Federal Judicial Center, http://www.fjc.gov; National Center for State Courts, 
http://www.ncsc.org/; State Justice Institute, http://www.sji.gov/.  Various universities and training 
institutions also offer programs for improving judicial practices.  For example, Duke University Law 
School offers an LL.M. degree in judicial studies while the Judicial Studies Institute at the University 
of Puerto Rico offers a bilingual course for judges from both the common law and civil law traditions. 
 130. For more on editing judicial writing, see FJC MANUAL, supra note 128, at 25-26; MAILHOT & 
CARNWATH, supra note 21, at 84. 
 131. See CALVERT G. CHIPCHASE, FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT: LAW CLERK HANDBOOK (2007); 
MARY L. DUNNEWOLD ET AL., JUDICIAL CLERKSHIPS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE (2010); FJC MANUAL, 
supra note 128, at 25-26; GEORGE, supra note 1, at 285-88, 723-27; FJC LAW CLERK HANDBOOK, 
supra note 31; JOSEPH L. LEMON, JR., FEDERAL APPELLATE COURT: LAW CLERK HANDBOOK (2007); 
MAILHOT & CARNWATH, supra note 21, at 84; ALIZA MILNER, JUDICIAL CLERKSHIPS: LEGAL 
METHODS IN MOTION (2011); JENNIFER SHEPPARD, IN CHAMBERS: A GUIDE FOR JUDICIAL CLERKS 
AND EXTERNS (2012); Frederick G. Hamley, Sample Instructions to Law Clerks, 26 VAND. L. REV. 
1241 (1973); Richard B. Klein, Opinion Writing Assistance Involving Law Clerks: What I Tell Them, 
34 JUDGES J. 33 (Summer 1995); Gerald Lebovits & Lucero Ramirez Hidalgo, Advice to Law Clerks: 
How to Draft Your First Judicial Opinion, 36 WESTCHESTER B.J. 29 (Spring-Summer 2009); Lebovits 
et al. supra note 123, at 237; Jennifer Sheppard, The “Write” Way: A Judicial Clerk’s Guide to Writ-
ing for the Court, 38 U. BALT. L. REV. 73 (2008); George Rose Smith, A Primer of Opinion Writing 
for Law Clerks, 26 VAND. L. REV. 1203 (1973); Eugene A. Wright, Observations of an Appellate 
Judge: The Use of Law Clerks, 26 VAND. L. REV. 1179 (1973); see also Ruth C. Vance, Judicial 
Opinion Writing: An Annotated Bibliography, 17 LEGAL WRITING 197, 204-31 (2011) (annotating the 
above titles). 
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Regardless of who writes the document or how the process is managed, the ele-
ments of good judicial writing remain the same.  The following sub-section there-
fore discusses the framework of a well-reasoned decision or opinion, including 
core considerations relating to scope, audience and structure. 
C.  Issues Relating to the Framework for Reasoned Judgments 
1.  Scope 
The process of drafting a reasoned judgment begins by considering questions 
of scope.
132
  Not every dispute merits a fully reasoned judgment, and judges must 
learn to differentiate between those matters that deserve a detailed legal analysis 
and those that do not.
133
 
In The Nature of the Judicial Process, Justice Benjamin Cardozo suggests 




The first category, the majority of the docket, is comprised of those 
cases where “[t]he law and its application alike are plain.”  Such cases 
“could not, with semblance of reason, be decided in any way but one.  
Such cases are predestined, so to speak, to affirmance without opinion.”  
To publish an opinion in such cases would contribute nothing new to the 
body of law or to the reader.  These cases do not merit even a non-
precedential opinion.  Instead, a plain judgment order or citation to the 
district court opinion in the appendix is sufficient. 
Cardozo’s second category of cases, a “considerable percentage” of the dock-
et, is comprised of those cases where “the rule of law is certain, and the applica-
tion alone doubtful.”  In such cases, 
[a] complicated record must be dissected, the narratives of witnesses, 
more or less incoherent and unintelligible, must be analyzed, to deter-
mine whether a given situation comes within one district or another upon 
the chart of rights and wrongs.  . . . Often these cases . . . provoke differ-
ence of opinion among judges.   Jurisprudence remains untouched, how-
ever, regardless of the outcome. 
                                                          
 132. See FJC MANUAL, supra note 128, at 3-7. 
 133. See GEORGE, supra note 1, at 276; Aldisert et al., supra note 48, at 12.  Another factor that may 
influence the writing process involves the possibility of publication.  However, many questions relat-
ing to publication arise as a matter of local law and practice and are therefore outside the scope of this 
Article.  See FJC MANUAL, supra note 128, at 6-7. 
 134. See CARDOZO, supra note 48, at 164-65; Aldisert et al., supra note 48, at 8.  Some authorities 
suggest there are four categories of cases:  where the facts and law are both clear; where the facts are 
clear but the law is not; where the law is clear but the facts are not; and where the law and facts are 
both disputed.  See GEORGE, supra note 1, at 240 (describing the ease with which each of these cases 
can be considered).  Although Justice Cardozo’s analysis focuses on appellate opinions, trial court 
judges can also benefit from this type of categorization. 
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It is in this second category that a non-precedential opinion is legitimate.  The 
rule of law is settled, and the only question is whether the facts come within the 
rule.  Such fact-oriented opinions do not add to our jurisprudence and thus do not 
require publication. 
It is only in Cardozo’s third and final category where an opinion for publica-
tion should be written.  “The final category . . . is comprised of cases ‘where a 
decision one way or the other, will count for the future, will advance or retard, 
sometimes much, sometimes little, the development of the law.’  . . . From such 
cases, each modestly articulating a narrow rule, emerge the principles that form 
the backbone of a court’s jurisprudence and warrant [a] full-length, signed pub-
lished opinion.”135 
This taxonomy of judicial disputes helps explain the character of different ju-
dicial rulings.
136
  Summary orders (also known as summary judgment orders) are 
used in Justice Cardozo’s first category of cases and usually run no more than a 
single page in length.
137
  Although a summary order may include a brief statement 
of the findings of fact and conclusions of law, it provides little or no explanation 
of why the court reached the outcome that it did.
138
 
Memoranda opinions are used in Cardozo’s second category of cases.139  The-
se documents, which are not considered precedential, are nevertheless slightly 
more fulsome than summary orders and therefore provide at least some descrip-
tion of how the court arrived at its decision.
140
  However, memoranda opinions do 
not qualify as fully reasoned judgments because they do not include either a de-
tailed discussion of the facts
141
 or a comprehensive explanation of the legal ration-
ales underlying the decision.
142
 
Both of these types of documents can be contrasted with fully reasoned opin-
ions and decisions, which are generated by Justice Cardozo’s third category of 
cases, i.e., “where a decision one way or the other, will count for the future, will 
advance or retard, sometimes much, sometimes little, the development of the 
law.”143  Although Justice Cardozo believed that these types of cases arose rela-
tively infrequently, he was writing prior to the adoption of various procedural 
rules promoting early settlement of civil litigation and the advent of alternative 
                                                          
 135. Aldisert et al., supra note 48, at 8-9 (quoting CARDOZO, supra note 48, at 164-65); see also 
GEORGE, supra note 1, at 32-34 (discussing types of judicial writings). 
 136. See supra note 47 and accompanying text (discussing the need for a functional analysis to de-
termine what constitutes a reasoned judgment). 
 137. See CARDOZO, supra note 48, at 164; Aldisert et al., supra note 48, at 10-11. 
 138. See FJC MANUAL, supra note 128, app. B. 
 139. See CARDOZO, supra note 48, at 164; see also Aldisert et al., supra note 48, at 8, 11.  Per curiam 
opinions fall slightly above the category of disputes that can be decided by memoranda opinions.  See 
id. at 9 (noting per curiam decisions are used “when the rule of law and its application to relatively 
simple facts are clear, or where the law has been made clear by an appellate decision” and discussing 
various circumstances in which such opinions are proper); see also GEORGE, supra note 1, at 282-83, 
322-24 (defining per curiam decisions). 
 140. See FJC MANUAL, supra note 128, app. A; GEORGE, supra note 1, at 325-26; Aldisert et al., 
supra note 48, at 11. 
 141. See Aldisert et al., supra note 48, at 11. 
 142. See FJC MANUAL, supra note 128, app. A; GEORGE, supra note 1, at 325-26; Aldisert et al., 
supra note 48, at 11. 
 143. CARDOZO, supra note 48, at 165; see also Aldisert et al., supra note 48, at 8-9.  This definition 
of a fully reasoned judgment is akin to a fully reasoned award in the arbitral context, particularly in 
international commercial arbitration and investment arbitration.  See STRONG, ICA, supra note 32, at 
22. 
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dispute resolution.
144
  As a result, the percentage of cases needed a reasoned 
judgment may be higher now than in Justice Cardozo’s time, since the only dis-
putes that currently make their way to final disposition by a court are those that 
are too difficult to settle as either a legal or factual matter.
145
 
The scope of the facts and law in contention define the focus of the reasoned 
judgment.  For example, matters that are factually complex require courts, by 
necessity, to summarize and analyze factual issues in more depth.  Disputes that 
turn on novel issues of law require courts to spend more time on both the govern-
ing law as well as the underlying policies that drive the law in a particular direc-
tion. 
Novice judges can find it difficult to differentiate between a factual finding 
and a legal conclusion.
146
  “Findings of fact may be defined as those facts which 
are deduced from the evidence and which are found by the judge to be essential to 
the judgment rendered in the case.”147  Conclusions of law, on the other hand, “are 
drawn by the judge through the exercise of her [or her] legal judgment from those 
facts he [or she] has found previously as the trier of fact.”148 
The inductive nature of common law analysis requires judges in the United 
States to give due consideration to the factual basis of any legal claim that is 
made.
149
  Reasoned decisions and opinions must therefore provide a sufficient 
level of factual detail to identify the boundaries and context of the legal ruling so 
that parties can determine going forward whether their behavior falls into the cat-
egory of conduct being regulated.
150
  Factual analyses can also help demonstrate 
why a particular outcome is appropriate as a matter of policy. 
Although the scope of a judicial opinion is heavily affected by factual consid-
erations, legal issues are equally important.  “If the issue has been thoroughly 
discussed in prior opinions, the judge need not trace the origins of the law or elab-
                                                          
 144. See CARDOZO, supra note 48, at 165; Aldisert et al., supra note 48, at 8; Jeffrey M. Stempel, 
Reflections on Judicial ADR and the Multi-door Courthouse at Twenty: Fait Accompli, Failed Over-
ture, or Fledgling Adulthood?, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DISPUTE RESOL. 297, 312, 319-23 (1996).  Justice 
Cardozo passed away in 1938, the same year that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted. 
 145. See Stempel, supra note 144, at 319-23; S.I. Strong, Beyond International Commercial Arbitra-
tion?  The Promise of International Commercial Mediation, 45 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 11, 17-18 
(2014). 
 146. See Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 113-14 (1985) (“[T]he appropriate methodology for distin-
guishing questions of fact from questions of law has been, to say the least, elusive,” and acknowledg-
ing “the practical truth that the decision to label an issue a ‘question of law,’ a ‘question of fact,’ or a 
‘mixed question of law and fact’ is sometimes as much a matter of allocation as it is of analysis.” 
(citations omitted)); see also GEORGE, supra note 1, at 235-38 (including examples). 
 147. GEORGE, supra note 1, at 188 (noting findings of fact are “a form of judicial inquiry”). 
 148. Id. at 189 (noting “[w]hen the judge considers the facts and draws the legal conclusion . . . [the 
statement] becomes a conclusion of law”). 
 149. See STRONG ET AL., supra note 57, ch. 3; see also supra note 57 and accompanying text.  The 
common law has been said to place 
its faith in experience rather than in abstractions.  It is a frame of mind which prefers to go 
forward cautiously on the basis of experience from this case or that case to the next case, as 
justice in each case seems to require, instead of seeking to refer everything back to supposed 
universals.  It is a frame of mind which is not ambitious to deduce the decision for the case 
in hand from a proposition formulated universally . . . .  It is the . . . habit of dealing with 
things as they arise instead of anticipating them by abstract universal formulas. 
Roscoe Pound, What Is the Common Law, in THE FUTURE OF THE COMMON LAW 3, 18 (1937), as 
quoted in ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 50, at 259. 
 150. See STRONG ET AL., supra note 57, ch. 3. 
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orate on its interpretation.”151  If, however, the case involves a legal issue that is 
less well-developed or a rule that will be modified or extended, then 
[t]he judge should discuss and analyze the precedents in the area, the new 
direction the law is taking, and the effect of the decision on existing law.  
Even if it appears that the litigants do not need a detailed statement of the 
facts, the opinion should present sufficient facts to define for other read-
ers the precedent it creates and to delineate its boundaries. The relevant 
precedents—and the relevant policies—should be analyzed in sufficient 
detail to establish the rationale for the holding.
152
 
Finally, a well-reasoned judgment needs to weigh the conflicts involved in 
the dispute thoughtfully and disinterestedly (thereby demonstrating the reasona-
bleness of the decision) while also demonstrating how fair and long-lasting the 
resolution of the conflict will be (thereby demonstrating the logic of the deci-
sion).
153
  Although this is a challenging goal, it is one to which all reasoned deci-
sions and opinions should nevertheless aspire. 
2.  Audience 
Knowing one’s audience is one of the fundamental rules of good writing, re-
gardless of context.
154
  Because “[t]he basic purpose of a judicial opinion is to tell 
participants in the lawsuit why the court acted the way it did,”155 conventional 
wisdom suggests that judges should direct their statements to the parties, and, in 




 This advice is absolutely true, as far as it goes.  Certainly the litigants 
must be able to understand the decision, since they “have an all-pervasive inter-
est” in the outcome of the dispute.157  However, reasoned decisions and opinions 
are read by many different people and for many different purposes.  Judges must 
therefore consider whether and to what extent they are also writing for the bar, the 
legislature, the media, other judges (including both future judges and in some 
cases other members of an appellate panel) and/or lay members of the public.
158
  
Appellate courts must also think about “the effect the opinion will have on itself 
as an institution charged with responsibilities for setting precedent and for defin-
ing law.”159 
                                                          
 151. FJC MANUAL, supra note 128, at 4. 
 152. Id. at 4-5. 
 153. This test has been attributed to Roscoe Pound of Harvard and Harry Jones of Columbia.  See 
Aldisert et al., supra note 48, at 20. 
 154. See Jeffrey A. Van Detta, The Decline and Fall of the American Judicial Opinion, Part II: Back 
to the Future From the Roberts Court to Learned Hand – Segmentation, Audience, and the Opportuni-
ty of Justice Sotomayor, 13 BARRY L. REV. 29, 34 (2009) [hereinafter Van Detta 2]. 
 155. Aldisert et al., supra note 48, at 17. 
 156. See id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. See FJC MANUAL, supra note 128, at 5-6; DOMNARSKI, supra note 8, at 94-95; GEORGE, supra 
note 1, at 148-50; MAILHOT & CARNWATH, supra note 21, at 11; Aldisert et al., supra note 48, at 15-
16, 19-20; Robert A. Leflar, Some Observations Concerning Judicial Opinions, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 
810, 813-14 (1961). 
 159. Aldisert et al., supra note 48, at 17. 
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Writing for such a diverse audience can be challenging.  However, experts 
have suggested that “[t]he mark of a well-written opinion is that it is comprehen-
sible to an intelligent layperson,” since that standard will meet the needs of all 
possible audience members.
160
  As a result, decisions and opinions must be “clear, 
logical, unambiguous, and free of” legal jargon161 while also reflecting consisten-
cy and coherence with existing legal authorities.
162
  Although a judge must always 
be true to his or her own beliefs, “[o]pinions should not . . . be turned into briefs or 
vehicles for advocacy.”163 
3.  Structure 
As important as questions of scope and audience may be, the real challenge 
involves structure.  Without a good structure, a writer cannot hope to persuade or 
even inform his or her reader.
164
 
Perhaps the most often-used and well-regarded structural framework for rea-
soned decisions and opinions is based on the classical principles of Greco-Roman 
rhetoric.
165
  Although ancient theories of communication may initially appear 




This model includes five different sections that are each set off by a header.
167
  
Although the content of each section varies somewhat according to whether the 
ruling is from a trial court or an appellate court, the core elements remain the 
same.
168
  The five sections include: 
 
 an opening paragraph or orientation (exordium); 
 a summary of the issues to be discussed (divisio); 
 a recitation of material adjudicative facts (narratio); 
 an analysis of the legal issues (confirmatio a. confutatio); and 




                                                          
 160. FJC MANUAL, supra note 128, at 6. 
 161. Aldisert et al., supra note 48, at 18. 
 162. See id. (discussing principles initially set forth by Professor Neil MacCormick of the University 
of Edinburgh). 
 163. FJC MANUAL, supra note 128, at 5. 
 164. See STRONG & DESNOYER, supra note 41, ch. 1. 
 165. See RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, OPINION WRITING 77-82 (2d ed. 2009); FJC MANUAL, supra note 
128, at 13; GEORGE, supra note 1, at 291-304; MAILHOT & CARNWATH, supra note 21, at 37-38; 
EDWARD D. RE, APPELLATE OPINION WRITING 11 (1975), available at http://www.fjc.gov; SUPREME 
COURT OF OHIO, supra note 106, at 129-30 (providing an outline of a judgment), available at 
http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/manual.pdf; Aldisert et al., supra note 48, at 24; George Rose 
Smith, A Primer of Opinion Writing, for Four New Judges, 21 ARK. L. REV. 197, 204 (1967). 
 166. This sort of segmentation is said to promote better understanding of the material.  See Van Detta 
2, supra note 154, at 32. 
 167. See STRONG & DESNOYER, supra note 41, ch. 3. 
 168. See GEORGE, supra note 1, at 161-84, 275-84.  For example, an appellate court would need to 
discuss the decision below, whereas a trial court would not. 
 169. See Aldisert et al., supra note 48, at 24; see also ALDISERT, supra note 165, at 77-82; FJC 
MANUAL, supra note 128, at 13; GEORGE, supra note 1, at 291-304; MAILHOT & CARNWATH, supra 
note 21, at 37-38; RE, supra note 165, at 11; SUPREME COURT OF OHIO, supra note 106, at 129-30; 
Smith, supra note 165, at 204. 
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This model does not include headnotes and syllabi, since those features are 
not considered authoritative in many jurisdictions.
170
  However, some experts 
have suggested that judges who sit in jurisdictions that consider the syllabus be 




i.  Orientation 
Experts agree that every well-reasoned decision or opinion should begin with 
an opening or orientation section that puts the legal and factual discussion into 
context and lets the reader know what is to come.
172
  Although substance is more 
important than style, a good orientation paragraph should nevertheless attempt to 
“pique the opinion reader’s interest with its language.”173 
Even though the orientation section is only one or two paragraphs long, it 
serves two important purposes.  First, this section describes the structure of the 
discussion so as to give readers a roadmap of where the author is going.
174
  Se-
cond, a good orientation paragraph provides readers with sufficient information to 
know whether they should continue reading.
175
  The most common consumers of 
reasoned judgments (typically lawyers and other judges) are often pressed for time 
and need to know immediately whether a decision or opinion is relevant to the 
issue they are researching.
176
  As a result, all of the critical information about the 
case should appear in the orientation section.
177
   
One way to approach an orientation section is by reference to the six ques-
tions posed by journalists:  who, what, when, where, why and how.
178
  “Who” is 
perhaps the easiest of the questions to answer, since it simply requires the judge to 




                                                          
 170. See Gregory Aubuchon, A Forensic Economist’s Guide to Reading Legal Decisions, 16 J. LEGAL 
ECON. 71, 76 (Oct. 2009). 
 171. See Smith, supra note 165, at 204.  See also GEORGE, supra note 1, at 177, 179; SUPREME 
COURT OF OHIO, supra note 106, at 131 (noting the principle cited in the syllabus will control if a 
conflict exists between the syllabus and the text of the judgment itself); Gerald Lebovits, The Third 
Series: A Review, 77 N.Y. STATE BAR J. 30, 32 (Mar./Apr. 2005) (noting the statutory duty to include 
headnotes of some decisions in New York) [hereinafter Lebovits, Review]. 
 172. See Aldisert et al., supra note 48, at 24-25.  Some commentators refer to this section as “the 
nature of the action.”  GEORGE, supra note 1, at 162. 
 173. Aldisert et al., supra note 48, at 27. 
 174. Judges in common law countries should be familiar with this type of orientation from their years 
in practice.  See STRONG, HOW TO WRITE, supra note 21, at 180-81 (discussing executive summaries); 
see also supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text (noting common law judges are usually experienced 
practitioners). 
 175. See Aldisert et al., supra note 48, at 25. 
 176. See id. 
 177. For examples of both good and bad orientation paragraphs, see Smith, supra note 165, at 205 
(citing his own opinions in Johnson v. Smith, 219 S.W.2d 926 (Ark. 1949), McClure Ins. Agency v. 
Hudson, 377 S.W.2d 814 (Ark. 1964), Garner v. Amsler, 377 S.W.2d 872 (Ark. 1964), and 
Dereuisseaux v. Bell, 378 S.W.2d 208 (Ark. 1964)).  For advice specific to appellate judges, see RE, 
supra note 165, at 14; Smith, supra note 165, at 204. 
 178. See GEORGE, supra note 1, at 12; Smith, supra note 165, at 204.  This technique is appropriate 
for both appellate and trial court judges.  See GEORGE, supra note 1, at 12; Smith, supra note 165, at 
204. 
 179. See Aldisert et al., supra note 48, at 26. 
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“What” is also relatively straightforward.  Here, the judge merely needs to 
identify the particular area of law that is addressed in the judgment and outline the 
specific legal issues at stake.
180
  Thus, a judge might indicate that the case in-
volved a claim in negligence and that the primary issue in contention involved 
whether the defendant owed a legal duty to the plaintiff.
181
 
“When” is important in both trial-level and appellate courts, although the 
question may be framed in a slightly different manner, depending on the con-
text.
182
  In trial courts, “when” would likely refer to the timing of the legal injury 
so as to establish whether the case was being brought in a timely manner and/or to 
ascertain the scope of any possible damages.
183
  In appellate courts, the question 




“Where” can relate to a variety of issues.185  For example, an appellate court 
might need to establish where the appeal is coming from so as to demonstrate that 
appellate jurisdiction exists.
186
  Trial judges may also frame the question of 
“where” as jurisdictional in nature, since courts are often only competent to hear 
matters that arise within their own particular territory.
187
  Although jurisdictional 
issues can be considered in response to a “where” question, there is no need to 
characterize jurisdictional matters in that particular light.  However, judges should 
always indicate the basis for the court’s jurisdiction over the matter at bar, regard-
less of how they frame the issue.
188
 
The next question relates to “why” a matter has been brought to the court’s 
attention.  Sometimes, this issue will have already been answered as a result of the 
“who,” “what,” “when,” or “where” analyses.189  However, a judge should raise 
this matter independently if it has not already been addressed, since the question 




“How” is primarily a procedural question relating to the way the issue 
reached the court.
191
  Thus, a trial court judge may wish to indicate whether a 
decision relates to a matter that was raised on motion or following a full trial.
192
  
                                                          
 180. See id. 
 181. The tort of negligence typically requires the plaintiff to establish the existence of a legal duty, 
breach of that duty, legal causation, factual causation and damages.  See Detraz v. Lee, 950 So.2d 557, 
562 (La. 2007); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM 
§6, cmt. b.  Only some of these issues will be in doubt in any particular case.  See STRONG, HOW TO 
WRITE, supra note 21, at 39. 
 182. See GEORGE, supra note 1, at 12; Smith, supra note 165, at 204. 
 183. See GEORGE, supra note 1, at 12; Smith, supra note 165, at 204. 
 184. See Aldisert et al., supra note 48, at 26. 
 185. See GEORGE, supra note 1, at 12; Smith, supra note 165, at 204. 
 186. See Aldisert et al., supra note 48, at 26. 
 187. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).  The issue is occasionally framed in terms of venue 
rather than jurisdiction.  See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 18.  Of course, there are times when a court accepts 
jurisdiction over an extraterritorial act.  See Dan E. Stigall, International Law and Limitations on the 
Exercise of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in U.S. Domestic Law, 35 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 
323, 324-25 (2012). 
 188. See Aldisert et al., supra note 48, at 27.  When discussing this issue, appellate courts should 
address not only their own jurisdiction, but also that of the trial court.  See id. at 28. 
 189. See GEORGE, supra note 1, at 12; Smith, supra note 165, at 204. 
 190. See GEORGE, supra note 1, at 12; Smith, supra note 165, at 204. 
 191. See GEORGE, supra note 1, at 12; Smith, supra note 165, at 204. 
 192. See Aldisert et al., supra note 48, at 26. 
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Similarly, an appellate court may wish to indicate whether the dispute was heard 
as of right or as a matter of discretion.
193
  In either case, it is important to know 
how the matter reached the court. 
The “how” paragraph can also be interpreted as indicating how the court has 
decided to rule.  While some judges believe that withholding the result until the 
end of the decision or opinion increases the reader’s anticipation, there is little to 
be gained by not indicating the outcome in the orientation paragraph, since most 
readers who do not find the holding in the orientation paragraph simply turn to the 
end of the document to find out how the case was decided.
194
  In fact, numerous 
authorities suggest that the orientation paragraph should include a reference to the 
holding or disposition “as a guide to the intelligent reading of the opinion” or 
decision.
195
  When announcing the outcome of the dispute, judges should avoid 
using the passive tense or other indirect language (such as “I believe”), since such 
language “dilute[s] the vigor which should characterize the result.”196 
A clear reference to the outcome of the case may be particularly important in 
“splintered” decisions, where a claim is denied in part and granted in part.197  Plu-
rality decisions offer similar opportunities for confusion, which suggest a height-
ened need for well-written orientation paragraphs.
198
  Although the orientation 
section is comprehensive in scope, it should be very brief.
199
  In fact, 
[t]he simplest form of preview statement sets forth the legal issue and the 
answer to it in the most concise form possible.  The following opening 
paragraph is a classic: “We are called upon to determine whether “at-
tempted assault” is a crime in the state of California.  We conclude that it 
is not.”200 
Learning to write a good orientation section takes practice, and even experi-
enced judges spend considerable time getting the wording just right.
201
  However, 
the benefits of a clear, concise opening justify the time spent on drafting. 
ii.  Summary of legal issues 
The second section of a reasoned decision or opinion involves a summary of 
the various legal issues that will be discussed in the body of the document.
202
  This 
                                                          
 193. See GEORGE, supra note 1, at 12; Smith, supra note 165, at 204. 
 194. See GEORGE, supra note 1, at 301 (discussing views of Judge Richard Posner and Judge Patricia 
Wald); MAILHOT & CARNWATH, supra note 21, at 53. 
 195. Aldisert et al., supra note 48, at 27 (quoting B.E. WITKIN, MANUAL ON APPELLATE COURT 
OPINIONS § 57, at 93 (1977)).  The term “holding” is used to describe the outcome of a trial court 
decision, whereas the term “disposition” refers to the outcome of an appellate court proceeding.  See 
GEORGE, supra note 1, at 37. 
 196. MAILHOT & CARNWATH, supra note 21, at 54. 
 197. See SUPREME COURT OF OHIO, supra note 106, at 150 (containing example). 
 198. See Robin Kundis Craig, Agencies Interpreting Courts Interpreting Statutes: The Deference 
Conundrum of a Divided Supreme Court, 61 EMORY L. J. 1, 7-10 (2011) (discussing the difficulties 
associated with plurality opinions); Justin Marceau, Plurality Decisions: Upward-Flowing Precedent 
and Acoustic Separation, 45 CONN. L. REV. 933, 935-37 (2013) (same). 
 199. See Aldisert et al., supra note 48, at 26. 
 200. Id. at 27 (quoting In re James M., 9 Cal. 3d 517, 519 (1973)).  This approach is similar to that 
used in legal practice.  See STRONG, HOW TO WRITE, supra note 21, at 105. 
 201. See Aldisert et al., supra note 48, at 26. 
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Some writers worry about discussing legal issues outside their factual context, 
thinking that such an analysis is too academic and treatise-like.
204
  However, the 
goal in this subsection is not to discuss the law in a vacuum, but rather to provide 
a clear analysis of the legal dispute that will ultimately be informed by the materi-
al adjudicative facts.
205
  This technique not only brings the discussion of legal 
concerns down to a manageable size, it helps the reader better understand the ma-
teriality of the facts that are presented later in the decision or opinion.
206
  “The 
effect is like reading a review of a movie before seeing it, so that one knows what 
to look for in the theater.”207 
Some disputes present more than one legal issue.
208
  However, this situation is 
not unduly problematic, since there are a number of ways of handling these types 
of complex matters.
209
  Some judges present all of the potential legal issues in a 
single summary paragraph, while other judges split up the various issues and in-
troduce them in separate paragraphs under topic sentences introducing individual 
sub-issues.
210
  Either technique is fine, so long as the approach is clear to the read-
er. 
When discussing legal issues, it is usually not necessary to address everything 
raised by counsel in detail, since it is the court, not the parties, who control the 
scope and content of a legal ruling.
211
  While it is important to address any claim, 
defense, error or objection that has been properly raised or preserved on appeal, 




Although trial judges and appellate judges can usually approach the summary 
of legal issues in a relatively similar manner, appellate judges do need to be sure 
                                                          
 202. See id. at 28. 
 203. An issue can be defined as “a point in dispute between two or more parties.  In an appeal, an 
issue may take the form of a separate and discrete question of law or fact, or a combination of both.”  
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (2009).  Strictly separating the legal and factual analysis is a skill that is 
first taught in law school.  See STRONG, HOW TO WRITE, supra note 21, at 53-97; STRONG & 
DESNOYER, supra note 41, chs. 4-5. 
 204. See STRONG, HOW TO WRITE, supra note 21, at 69, 81. 
 205. See Aldisert et al., supra note 48, at 28.  Adjudicative facts are those that are adduced through 
evidence at trial.  See FED. R. EVID. 201, advisory committee note (a). 
 206. See Aldisert et al., supra note 48, at 28. 
 207. Id. 
 208. See STRONG, HOW TO WRITE, supra note 21, at 42-43 (discussing cases with multiple causes of 
action and/or multiple party pairings). 
 209. See Aldisert et al., supra note 48, at 28. 
 210. See id. at 28-29. 
 211. See GEORGE, supra note 1, at 167; Aldisert et al., supra note 48, at 29; see also MAILHOT & 
CARNWATH, supra note 21, at 51 (noting “if the plaintiff is in favour of a proposition the reader can 
usually infer the defendant is against it”).  Some jurisdictions, most notably England, follow different 
practices.  See STRONG, HOW TO WRITE, supra note 21, at 21-22 (noting that English judges often 
include detailed summaries of the arguments of counsel and of the courts below); see also Lebovits, 
Review, supra note 171, at 32 (discussing the statutory duty in New York to include counsel’s argu-
ments in the judicial report). 
 212. See GEORGE, supra note 1, at 295; Aldisert et al., supra note 48, at 29.  Thus, a court does not 
need to give equal weight to every item mentioned in a written decision or opinion.  See DOMNARSKI, 
supra note 8, at 94 (noting both district and appellate court practice); Aldisert et al., supra note 48, at 
29. 
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to include a separate paragraph describing the appropriate standard of review.
213
  
That standard is usually determined by reference to the matter under review, with 
the three most frequently used standards—clear error, abuse of discretion and 




iii.  Statement of facts 
A well-written factual analysis is critical to a well-reasoned decision or opin-
ion, since the judge needs to demonstrate and discuss the interaction between the 
law and the facts.
215
  Therefore, a judge must include all the relevant facts, alt-
hough he or she must simultaneously take care to avoid introducing any unneces-
sary facts, since additional elements not only slow the reader down but may cause 
confusion about the scope and future applicability of the legal principle enunciat-
ed in the judgment.
216
  As a result, “[o]nly material, adjudicative facts should be 
set forth in the opinion” or decision.217 
To determine what facts are material, judges look to the substantive law.
218
  
Only “facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law” can 
be considered material.
219
  Focusing on facts “that are truly essential as opposed to 
those that are decorative and adventitious” allows the “conclusion . . . to follow so 
naturally and inevitably as almost to prove itself.”220 
                                                          
 213. See Aldisert et al., supra note 48, at 30-31.  Appellate courts can accept review on a variety of 
matters, including “review of the sufficiency of the evidence to meet the required burden of persuasion 
at the trial level; review of the exercise of discretion; and plenary review of the choice, interpretation, 
and application of the controlling legal precepts.”  Id. at 30. 
 214. See id. at 30.  Notably, the standard of review differs from the scope of review.  See GEORGE, 
supra note 1, at 297. 
 215. See ALDISERT, supra note 165, at 136 (noting a well-reasoned judgment “requires an identifica-
tion of resemblances [between the facts of two cases], which we may call positive analogies, and 
differences, which we may call negative analogies”).  Although this technique is most important in 
common law jurisdictions, where the principle of stare decisis requires similar cases to be treated in a 
similar manner, other jurisdictions also have an interest in ensuring the predictability of the law.  See 
Aldisert et al., supra note 48, at 31-32; supra note 94 and accompanying text.  Civil law lawyers often 
find the concept of common law reasoning very difficult to grasp, although there may be an increased 
acceptance of the case law method in a number of civil law countries.  See Helena Whalen-Bridge, The 
Reluctant Comparativist: Teaching Common Law Reasoning to Civil Law Students and the Future of 
Comparative Legal Skills, 58 J. LEGAL EDUC. 364, 365-66 (2008); Shoenberger, supra note 28, at 5. 
 216. See Aldisert et al., supra note 48, at 31. 
 217. Id. 
 218. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (considering materiality in the 
context of a motion for summary judgment).  Different jurisdictions may adopt different definitions as 
to the materiality of a certain issue.  See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010), 
Brief of the International Chamber of Commerce et al. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, at 
24 (noting the different definitions of materiality under U.S. and Swiss law). 
 219. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248 (considering materiality in the context of a motion for summary 
judgment); see also Youngblood v. West Virginia, 547 U.S. 867, 870 (2006); Willis v. Roche Biomed-
ical Labs., Inc., 61 F.3d 313, 315 (5th Cir. 1995); Buirkle v. Hanover Ins. Co., 832 F. Supp. 2d. 469, 
471-73, 489 (D. Mass. 1993); People v. White, 308 N.W.2d 128, 131-32 (Mich. 1981); ALDISERT, 
supra note 165, at 137.  For examples from both U.S. and English law, see id. at 139-40 (discussing 
Rylands v. Fletcher, (1868) L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (HL), and Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)). 
 220. Aldisert et al., supra note 48, at 31-32 (quoting Benjamin N. Cardozo, Law and Literature, 14 
YALE L.J. 705 (1925); see also ALDISERT, supra note 165, at 138-40.  In some ways, the task of decid-
ing what constitutes a material versus non-material fact is not as difficult as it seems, since a judge has 
been considering those issues throughout the proceedings.  See GEORGE, supra note 1, at 232 (noting 
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When summarizing the facts, judges must ensure the accuracy of each indi-
vidual element.
221
  “While the author may interpret the law liberally or strictly, he 
[or she] must not take this kind of liberty with the facts.”222  Experts suggest pull-
ing the facts from the record itself rather than adopting the proposed findings of 
facts submitted by one of the parties, both to minimize error and to avoid claims 
that the judge has not exercised the requisite amount of independent judgment 
when reviewing the facts.
223
 
When describing the material facts, a judge needs to do more than simply re-
count the evidence.
224
  Instead, the decision or opinion must “set out express find-
ings of fact showing how the judge reasoned from the evidentiary facts to the 
ultimate fact” that decides a particular legal issue.225  While it is often best to state 




If witness testimony is discussed, the court of first instance should address is-
sues of credibility.
227
  However, the judge does not need to list all of the witnesses 
who have appeared.
228
  Instead, it is sufficient to “identify the undisputed facts and 
make findings of those in dispute, all within the rubric of pertinence.  It is im-
portant to make findings of credibility when establishing the probative force of a 
witness’ testimony, and to give reasons.”229 
Some authorities believe that the summary of the facts should precede the 
summary of the legal issues, although there is no consensus on that point.
230
  Ul-
timately, the order of the various sections is a matter of individual preference.
231
  
However, most experts suggest writing the summary of the issues before writing 
the summary of the facts so as to avoid including immaterial factual information 
in the summary of the facts.
232




                                                          
“[t]he judge’s definition of what is and is not [legally] at issue . . . determines the evidence to be pre-
sented and limits what will be heard” at trial). 
 221. See Aldisert et al., supra note 48, at 33. 
 222. GEORGE, supra note 1, at 164. 
 223. See United States v. El Paso Nat. Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651, 656-57 (1964); United States v. Cres-
cent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173, 184-85 (1944); Bright v. Westmoreland Cnty., 380 F.3d 729, 731-
32 (3d Cir. 2004); GEORGE, supra note 1, at 187.  Commentators have cautioned against “judicial 
plagiarism,” which occurs when a judge does not give proper credit for a particular statement or propo-
sition.  See id. at 707-27. 
 224. See GEORGE, supra note 1, at 194-95.  The description of facts is as important on appeal as in 
the first instance.  See MAILHOT & CARNWATH, supra note 21, at 49. 
 225. GEORGE, supra note 1, at 195 (discussing an example).  “The judge must formulate the ultimate 
or conclusionary fact by scrutinizing the evidentiary facts.”  Id. 
 226. See MAILHOT & CARNWATH, supra note 21, at 48. 
 227. See id. at 50. 
 228. See id. 
 229. Id. 
 230. See Aldisert et al., supra note 48, at 24.  One expert suggests that “[f]acts should be stated in the 
past tense” while “[p]ropositions of law should be stated in the present tense,” but that does not appear 
to be a hard and fast rule.  GEORGE, supra note 1, at 163. 
 231. See Aldisert et al., supra note 48, at 28, 33. 
 232. See MAILHOT & CARNWATH, supra note 21, at 45-47; Aldisert et al., supra note 48, at 28. 
 233. See Aldisert et al., supra note 48, at 28, 33.  Editing is as important as writing.  See MAILHOT & 
CARNWATH, supra note 21, at 84 (suggesting judges revise their draft texts somewhere between three 
and eight times). 
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iv.  Analysis of the legal issues 
The fourth section constitutes the core of a reasoned decision or opinion.
234
  
This section provides a detailed analysis of the legal issues and presents the ra-
tionale for reaching the outcome in question.
235
 
There are a variety of ways to organize this section.  For example, if there is 
one issue dispositive of the dispute, then it is often best to begin with that issue.
236
  
If there is no single issue that controls the outcome, then a judge may follow the 
order set forth by counsel or begin with either the easiest or the most difficult of 
the outstanding issues, whichever seems best.
237
  Regardless of the order adopted, 
“[t]here is but one obligation: to correctly describe the arguments in support of 
each party’s position on each issue, and to give clear reasons justifying the re-
sult.”238 
Reasoned judgments differ from written advocacy in several key ways.
239
  For 
example, reasoned decisions and opinions 
[r]esemble a form of justification. . . .  [J]udges are not required to con-
vince, but rather to make themselves understood.  They must therefore 
express their reasons in a fashion that will carry with them the support of 
the majority of the readers.  The losing parties may never be convinced 
their cause was wrong but they are entitled to know why they lost and 
how the judge reached that result.
240
 
Judicial analyses should therefore be both thoughtful and neutral so as to give 
both the parties and society as a whole reason to trust in the integrity of the sys-
tem.
241
  Furthermore, judges should be very careful about adopting any proposed 
conclusions of law submitted by a party, since that may cause doubts about 
whether the judge considered the case fully and independently.
242
  Functionally, 
[j]udges must decide all the issues in a case on the basis of general prin-
ciples that have legal relevance; the principles must be ones the judges 
would be willing to apply to the other situations that they reach; and the 
                                                          
 234. See Aldisert et al., supra note 48, at 34. 
 235. See id. 
 236. See MAILHOT & CARNWATH, supra note 21, at 51. 
 237. See id. 
 238. Id.; see also GEORGE, supra note 1, at 172 (noting each issue discussed requires a separate 
conclusion); MAILHOT & CARNWATH, supra note 21, at 52 (noting “reasons are the foundation of the 
result, a form of justification”); Aldisert et al., supra note 48, at 34. 
 239. MAILHOT & CARNWATH, supra note 21, at 52. 
 240. Id.; see also ALDISERT, supra note 165, at 157-66 (discussing inductive and deductive reason-
ing). 
 241. See Aldisert et al., supra note 48, at 34 (indicating court opinions should “do[] substantial justice 
in the case,” impose “justice between the parties” and “maintain the integrity of the ‘body of the law’ 
for future litigants”).  Appellate judges may also need to discuss any concurring or dissenting opinions.  
While some authors address their colleagues’ concerns in the body of the judgment (a step that may be 
necessary if the analysis of the dissent or concurrence is quite long), it is also possible to address these 
matters in the footnotes. 
 242. See GEORGE, supra note 1, at 187-88.  However, when drafting the conclusions of law, it may be 
necessary to refer to the losing party’s argument, either to demonstrate why that approach was not 
adopted or to show that that particular matter was considered. 
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Although “[t]he legal conclusion should cover each of the legal elements re-
quired to decide the case,”244 the goal is not to “state the law [as] fully and com-
prehensively . . . as might be expected in writing a law review” or “to resolve 
unasked questions or legal issues not yet in dispute.”245  Indeed, it is generally 
considered “improper for the judge to state more in a decision/opinion than is 
necessary or to resolve or attempt to resolve future problems.”246  While some 
courts (such as the court of last resort) might be inclined to suggest how the law 
might develop in the future, such statements are technically made ober dicta and 
can cause significant problems in the lower courts.
247
 
When undertaking a legal analysis, a judge faces three possible scenarios.  
First, after “identify[ing] the flash point of the conflict,” the judge may find him or 
herself required to “choose among competing legal precepts to determine which 
should control.”248  Once the controlling principle of law is determined, that prin-
ciple must then be interpreted and applied to the facts of the case.
249
 
Second, the judge may not have any difficulties identifying which of several 
competing principles controls the issue but may nevertheless need to decide how 
                                                          
 243. Kent Greenawalt, The Enduring Significance of Legal Principles, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 982, 990 
(1978); see also Aldisert et al., supra note 48, at 36. 
 244. GEORGE, supra note 1, at 195. 
 245. Id. at 13.  Although conclusions of law focus on legal principles, they “should not be a recitation 
of the case [or statutory] authorities, but rather their specific application to the precise issues raised by 
the case.”  Id. at 195; see also STRONG & DESNOYER, supra note 41, ch. 5.  Instead, “[i]n drawing a 
legal conclusion it is important to identify the factual elements necessary to support that conclusion.”  
GEORGE, supra note 1, at 234.  Furthermore, a conclusion of law needs to be clear and concise.  Thus, 
one expert has suggested a conclusion of law should consist of 
1. A single statement; 
2. with legal significance; 
3. supported by those facts previously found; 
4. articulating the law applicable on an issue or element necessary to determine a disput-
ed principle of law; 
5. used along with other conclusions of law to determine the rights of the parties. 
Id. at 231-32. 
 246. GEORGE, supra note 1, at 13; see also id. at 233-34 (discussing the advantages and disad-
vantages of so-called “lecturing” decisions). 
 247. See Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451 (2001) (demonstrating the difficulties associated in 
determining whether a particular aspect of a previous decision reflected dicta or the Court’s ratio 
decidendi); see also GEORGE, supra note 1, at 331; Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, Defining 
Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REV. 953, 955-56 (2005). 
 248. Aldisert et al., supra note 48, at 35.  Judges in this situation may need to identify a controlling 
principle of law from a series of cases.  See id.  As a result, the court must study the various cases, 
which each announce “a specific rule of law attached to a detailed set of facts.”  Id.  That inquiry may 
allow the court “to ‘find’ or create a broader legal precept attached to a broad set of facts.”  Id.; see 
also GEORGE, supra note 1, at 349-68; DEBORAH B. MCGREGOR & CYNTHIA M. ADAMS, THE 
INTERNATIONAL LAWYER’S GUIDE TO LEGAL ANALYSIS AND COMMUNICATION IN THE UNITED 
STATES 142-91 (2008).  Although this process may appear problematic to lawyers trained in the civil 
law tradition, Justice Cardozo has explained how the common law method complies with certain 
notions of natural law and is indeed consistent with certain readings of the civil law approach to statu-
tory interpretation.  See CARDOZO, supra note 48, at 142-45 (citing FRANÇOIS GÉNY, MÉTHODE 
D’INTERPRÉTATION ET SOURCES EN DROIT PRIVÉ POSITIF, vol. II (1919)). 
 249. See Aldisert et al., supra note 48, at 35. 
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to interpret that principle.
250
  This type of concern arises most frequently in cases 
involving statutory construction.
251
  In this situation, the judge does not need to 
discuss other potential legal principles at length but can focus only on the interpre-
tation of the law and the application of that law to the facts.
252
 
Third, the judge may be faced with disputes that are primarily factual in na-
ture.  In this category of cases, the judge only needs to focus on the application of 
the governing law (as chosen and interpreted) to the facts that have been estab-
lished by the finder of facts.
253
 
As helpful as it is to distinguish between different types of cases, judges must 
do more than apply the law mechanistically.
254
  Instead, reasoned judgments must 
“weigh the case for and against given rulings.”255  Although some of the elements 
that go into a reasoned judgment require a value judgment, judges “must not rely 
on value judgments to the exclusion of reasoned analysis.”256 
One question that is often raised involves the extent to which judges may 
conduct independent research.
257
  A number of courts have indicated that 
 [a] competent judge is not so naive to believe that briefs will always 
summarize the relevant facts and the applicable law in an accurate fash-
ion.  A competent judge uses the briefs as a starting line and not the fin-
ish line for his or her own independent research.  Not only does a good 
judge confirm that the authorities cited actually support the legal proposi-
tions in the briefs, a good judge also makes sure that the authorities con-
tinue to represent a correct statement of the law.  A member of the bench 
who fails to independently develop his or her own legal rationale does so 
at his or her own peril and the peril of the litigants.
258
 
Other authorities suggest precisely the opposite, based on the fact that inde-
pendent judicial research denies the parties of “the opportunity for cross-
examination, rebuttal, or the introduction of further testimony.”259  However, 
commentators have concluded that “the prerogative of the judge to search the case 
law independently and to consult legal treatises is soundly entrenched, presumably 
to promote uniformity and accuracy in legal interpretation.”260 
The situation is much more unsettled when it comes to independent factual 
research.
261
  Not only do surveys of state appellate judges suggest that the bench is 
sharply divided on this issue, but “the rules governing independent research are 
                                                          
 250. See id. 
 251. See id.  U.S. law has become increasingly codified.  See CALABRESI, supra note 93, at 5-7. 
 252. See Aldisert et al., supra note 48, at 35. 
 253. See id. 
 254. See id. at 36. 
 255. Id. 
 256. Id. at 37. 
 257. Some authorities suggest that “[w]hile the briefs prepared by the parties will be useful, there is 
no substitute for independent research.”  GEORGE, supra note 1, at 199. 
 258. Camacho v. Trimble Irrevocable Tr., 756 N.W.2d 596, 298-99 (Wisc. Ct. App. 2008); see also 
Hampton v. Wyant, 296 F.3d 560, 564-65 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 259. Edward K. Cheng, Independent Judicial Research in the Daubert Age, 56 DUKE L.J. 1263, 1296 
(2007) (noting that “[a] few judges and commentators have advocated against” independent legal 
research). 
 260. Id. 
 261. See id. at 1297. 
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astonishingly unclear.”262  Thus, commentators suggest that judges should conduct 
sua sponte research into factual matters very rarely and only in the interests of 
justice.
263
  As a practical matter, a judge who has discovered a factual issue of 
relevance should strongly consider asking the parties to provide written submis-
sions concerning that issue so as to avoid the possibility of a subsequent appeal.
264
 
v.  Holding or disposition 
The final section of a reasoned judgment involves the holding or disposition 
of the case.
265
  This section usually constitutes “a single paragraph or sentence at 
the end of the decision” and “is that portion of the decision that ultimately will be 
incorporated into the judgment.”266 
The content of this section differs somewhat depending on the type of court 
involved.  For example, trial courts should be sure to address all of the outstanding 
claims and defenses so as not to leave a gap that must later be remedied.
267
  Ap-
pellate courts should also take care to identify clearly which aspects of the lower 
court decision have been affirmed, reversed, vacated and remanded or modified, 
but should also indicate what obligations, if any, the court of first instance has 
with respect to the case at bar.
268
 
If a judge has not specifically discussed all of the issues presented in a civil 
dispute, then he or she should consider making a global statement indicating that 
all matters not explicitly addressed have been considered and determined to be 
without merit.
269
  If the dispute is criminal in nature, then it may be better for the 
judge to specify each issue that has been denied, even if the decision or award 
does not discuss that matter in detail.
270
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
As the preceding discussion suggests, writing a well-reasoned judgment is a 
difficult and time-consuming task.
271
  Although the process may seem particularly 
daunting to those who are new to the bench, many experienced judges also strug-
gle to convey their thoughts in a concise but coherent manner. 
Ideally, every judge would be able to take advantage of one or more in-person 
seminars involving judicial writing.
272
  Although the need for assistance is perhaps 
                                                          
 262. Id. at 1267.  This practice has been opposed by both courts and commentators.  See Hernandez v. 
State, 116 S.W.3d 26, 32 (Tx. Ct. Crim. App. 2003) (Keller, P.J., concurring); GEORGE, supra note 1, 
at 276. 
 263. See GEORGE, supra note 1, at 276. 
 264. See supra notes 68, 83 and accompanying text (discussing the need to protect the decision or 
opinion from appeal). 
 265. See Aldisert et al., supra note 48, at 24. 
 266. GEORGE, supra note 1, at 176; see also supra note 1. 
 267. See GEORGE, supra note 1, at 302-04 (discussing the types of opinions that should accompany 
the various types of dispositions); Aldisert et al., supra note 48, at 38.  This task can be particularly 
difficult in a splintered opinion.  See SUPREME COURT OF OHIO, supra note 106, at 150 (containing 
example). 
 268. See GEORGE, supra note 1, at 302-04; Aldisert et al., supra note 48, at 38. 
 269. See Aldisert et al., supra note 48, at 38. 
 270. See id. 
 271. See Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1176-77 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 272. See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text. 
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most urgent when judges first take the bench, more experienced judges would also 
benefit from this sort of instruction, since they now have some first-hand experi-
ence with the difficulties associated with writing a reasoned decision or opinion.  
The problem, of course, is that many judges find it hard to make the time to attend 
in-person seminars, particularly given expanding workloads and decreasing budg-
ets.
273
  For those people, a published guide on writing well-reasoned judicial deci-
sions and opinions may be the best way to trigger new ways of thinking about 
judicial writing. 
This Article has attempted to provide judges with precisely that type of assis-
tance.
274
  Hopefully there will be more such efforts in the future, since a well-
educated judiciary is critical to a well-functioning society.
275
 
                                                          
 273. Judicial spending has been under threat for years.  See American Bar Association, Federal Court 
Funding, http://www.americanbar.org/advocacy/governmental_legislative_work/priorities_policy/ 
independence_of_the_judiciary/federal-court-funding.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2015).  Concerns have 
been raised that interest groups are stepping into the breach created by the lack of funding for judicial 
education.  See Center for Public Integrity, supra note 10. 
 274. Further resources are available on this subject.  For example, in addition to the sources discussed 
herein, interested persons can consider materials identified in Vance, supra note 131, at 197.  See also 
A.B.A., Appellate Judges Conference, Judicial Administration Division, JUDICIAL OPINION WRITING 
MANUAL (1991), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/judicial-writing-manual-2d-
fjc-2013.pdf/$file/judicial-writing-manual-2d-fjc-2013.pdf; LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF 
JUDGES (1993); Samuel A. Alito, Jr. et al., Panel Remarks, The Second Conversation with Justice 
Samuel A. Alito, Jr.: Lawyering and the Craft of Judicial Opinion Writing, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 33 (2009); 
Richard B. Cappalli, Improving Appellate Opinions, 83 JUDICATURE 286 (May/June 2000); Elizabeth 
Ahlgren Francis, The Elements of Ordered Opinion Writing, 38 JUDGES J. 8 (Spring 1999); Chris 
Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777 (2001); Joseph Kimble, First Things 
First: The Lost Art of Summarizing, 38 CT. REV. 30 (Summer 2001); Douglas K. Norman, An Outline 
for Appellate Opinion Writing, 39 JUDGES J. 26 (Summer 2000); Frederick Schauer, Opinions as 
Rules, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1455 (1995); Timothy P. Terrell, Organizing Clear Opinions: Beyond Logic 
to Coherence and Character, 38 JUDGES J. 4 (Spring 1999); Patricia M. Wald, A Reply to Judge Pos-
ner, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1451 (1995); Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of 
Rhetoric: Judicial Writing, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371 (1995); Nancy A. Wanderer, Writing Better Opin-
ions: Communicating with Candor, Clarity, and Style, 54 ME. L. REV. 47 (2002); James Boyd White, 
What’s an Opinion for? 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1363 (1995); Charles R. Wilson, How Opinions Are Devel-
oped in the United States Court of Appeals of the Eleventh Circuit, 32 STETSON L. REV. 247 (2003).  
The Supreme Court of Ohio has provided a line-by-line critique by of several different types of rea-
soned judgments that may be particularly useful to judges seeking to improve their writing.  See 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO, supra note 106, at 132-48. 
 275. See S.I. Strong, Judicial Education and Regulatory Capture:  Does the Current System of Edu-
cating Judges Promote a Well-Functioning Judiciary and Adequately Serve the Public Interest?, 2015 
J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 4; see also supra notes 3, 52-55 and accompanying text. 
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